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Note
Tick-Bite Litigation: An Illustration of the
Battle Over Duty and Breach in
Connecticut and the Second Circuit
MICHAEL J. SENZER
In cases with tragic facts, the jury is perhaps the chief danger to a defendant.
Attorneys defending tort suits routinely argue that courts should dismiss a case on
grounds that a tortfeasor does not owe a victim a duty of care. This often takes the
form of an argument that fact-specific “limited” duties should be created in order to
dismiss a plaintiff’s case.
Two Connecticut cases—Munn v. Hotchkiss School, and Horowitz v. YMCA
Camp Mohawk, Inc.—are implicated in the broader debate regarding whether limited
duty is being used properly. The plaintiffs’ claims specifically concern injuries from
tick-borne illness (TBI) suffered by minors in educational environments. But there are
broader implications. With the Munn case raising serious questions of state law in the
context of an appeal to the Second Circuit—meriting certified questions to the
Connecticut Supreme Court—the role of limited duty in Connecticut jurisprudence is
ripe for review. Connecticut’s answer as to the proper use of limited duty in the Munn
case will likely have effects reaching far beyond these TBI cases.
This Note argues that Connecticut and other jurisdictions should embrace a form
of limited duty that is perhaps itself well described as “limited.” In order to preserve
factual issues for the trier of fact and the function of dispositive motions based on the
existence or non-existence of those issues (e.g., summary judgment), the existence of
duty should remain an abstract inquiry into the relationship between plaintiff and
defendant. Thus, this Note contends that public policy analysis should not play a role
in determining whether a legal duty exists unless there is a legal principle that merits
restricting the responsibilities that exist given the basic relationship between the
parties. In cases where the existence of a legal duty is otherwise clear at this level of
generality, courts should not use public policy analysis to qualify legal duty. Since the
duty inquiry is an inquiry into law and not facts, this sort of reserved approach is what
is judicially proper—in the TBI cases, and for all cases.
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Tick-Bite Litigation: An Illustration of the
Battle Over Duty and Breach in
Connecticut and the Second Circuit
MICHAEL J. SENZER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Ticks are dangerous creatures. Injuries from tick bites have led to
death,1 amputations,2 and paralysis,3 as well as fear among the uninjured.4
These parasites are small and public knowledge about them varies greatly.5
They have a salivary numbing agent, which makes detecting them
difficult.6 They can carry several diseases.7 Best practices in preventing
tick-borne illness (TBI) include wearing repellent, tucking socks into long
pants, and wearing boots,8 measures that perhaps cannot realistically be
*
University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2017; SUNY Geneseo, B.A. magna
cum laude, 2014. First, I thank my parents, Dr. Cheryl Leister Senzer and Hon. Paul H. Senzer, for
their love and support. I am also indebted to Professor James H. Stark for his constructive criticism
throughout the drafting of this Note. I thank the members of the Connecticut Law Review for attentive
editing and for fostering community within the law school.
1
See, e.g., Anna Edney, Newly Found Virus Linked to Kansas Death After Tick Bite,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Feb. 20, 2015, 2:08 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-0220/newly-found-virus-linked-to-kansas-man-s-death-after-tick-bite
[https://perma.cc/8P3V-LYVM]
(relating the circumstances of a Kansas man’s death from organ failure after being bitten by a tick).
2
E.g., Ben Brumfield, Tick Bite Leads to Amputation of Woman’s Limbs, CNN.COM (Aug. 14,
2015, 8:55 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/14/health/oklahoma-tick-bite-amputation-spotted-fever/
[https://perma.cc/F32M-6FQQ] (describing the circumstances under which an Oklahoma woman
suffered a serious tick-borne illness, necessitating amputations to each of her limbs).
3
See Laura Landro, Safety 101 for Summer Jaunts, WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2009, 1:40 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204261704574272140181146368 [http://web.archive.
org/web/20160809032814/http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204261704574272140181
146368] (discussing the injuries at issue in Munn v. Hotchkiss School, 24 F. Supp. 3d 155 (D. Conn.
2014)).
4
See, e.g., Alexandra Zissu, Ticks: Summer’s Unwanted Guests, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/13/fashion/ticks-summers-unwanted-guests.html?_r=0 [http://web.
archive.org/web/20150101000000*/http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/13/fashion/ticks-summersunwanted-guests.html?_r=0] (discussing a “growing phobia of diseases borne by the arachnid [ticks]
among . . . [the] set” in places like Greenwich, CT, and Shelter Island, NY).
5
See, e.g., Sue Byrne, Why Tick Bites Can Be So Dangerous, CONSUMER REP. (Aug. 20, 2015,
6:00 AM), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2015/08/why-tick-bites-can-be-so-dangerous/
index.htm [https://perma.cc/5TP8-QTVZ] (quoting a conversation with CDC research biologist Mark
C. Dolan).
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
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followed, at least routinely.
The threat of TBI has existed for as long as humans and ticks have
come into contact, but climate change has made the threat particularly
pressing.9 In 2014, the majority of domestic Lyme Disease cases originated
in the northeast.10
Injuries from tick bites have recently led to tort suits. In Connecticut,
two cases—Munn v. Hotchkiss School,11 and Horowitz v. YMCA Camp
Mohawk, Inc.12—suggest that schools and camps might be liable for TBI
suffered by minors in their care. These TBI cases are part of a broader
problem: when cases contain tragic facts, the chief danger to defendants
may be a jury. In an effort to bypass the jury in such cases,13 defense
lawyers argue that fact-specific limited duties are appropriate.
This Note argues that courts should not limit duties in cases where the
law concerning legal duty is clear and doing so would deprive the trier of
fact of its role. With respect to these TBI cases, educational caregivers’
duties to minors, arising out of the basic relationship between the parties,
should not be limited based on arguments about specific facts. In other
words, limited duties should not be recognized contrary to the general duty
of care that exists given the basic relationship between the parties. In order
to preserve facts for the jury, policy analysis ought not be reached unless a
clear legal principle evident based on the general relationship between the
parties warrants doing so. Recognizing a duty at this abstract level does not
necessarily mean that a defendant breaches its standard of care to a
9
Tick populations are reported to be soaring as a consequence of warmer global temperatures.
E.g., Christina Ross et al., Limiting Liability in the Greenhouse, 43A STAN. J. INT’L L. 251, 279 (2007)
(discussing the threats to human health that may become increasingly likely to cause harm as the planet
warms); Janine Maney, Note, Carbon Dioxide Emissions, Climate Change, and the Clean Air Act, 13
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 298, 361–63 (2005) (relating the causes of disease that the EPA anticipates to have
an increasingly adverse effect on the New England states as climate change occurs).
10
The CDC reports that 96% of cases of Lyme Disease reported in 2014 originated in fourteen
states, ten of which are in the northeast. See Data and Statistics, Lyme Disease, CDC.GOV,
http://www.cdc.gov/lyme/stats/ [https://perma.cc/2QP2-V4GF] (last visited Jan. 13, 2016) (identifying
Maryland, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Virginia as hotbeds for Lyme Disease outside of the northeast).
11
24 F. Supp. 3d 155 (Munn Trial) (D. Conn. 2014). In this case, the trial court denied the
defendant school’s post-trial motions and entered a $41.465 million jury verdict. Id. at 214. The case is
currently on appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Brief of Defendant-Appellant, Munn v.
Hotchkiss Sch., 795 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 12-2410-cv) [hereinafter Hotchkiss Brief]. The
Second Circuit has sent certified questions of law to the Connecticut Supreme Court. Munn v.
Hotchkiss Sch. (Munn Appeal), 795 F.3d 324, 337 (2d Cir. 2015).
12
Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 1–15, Horowitz v. YMCA Camp Mohawk, Inc., No.
3:13-CV-01458 (D. Conn. Oct. 4, 2013), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Horowitz Compl.]. Plaintiffs, a
teenager and her parents, allege that a defendant sleep-away camp, where the teen was apparently
exposed to a tick and contracted Lyme Disease, was negligent for its failure to warn of tick-related
risks, and that the camp’s nurses provided wanton health treatment. See id. (setting forth allegations as
to how the teenage plaintiff was apparently injured).
13
See Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Abusing “Duty”, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 265, 267
(2006) (claiming that “[t]he civil jury trial is now under growing attack”).
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plaintiff; nor does it mean that a defendant’s acts or omissions are the
proximate cause of a defendant’s injuries. It simply clarifies that these
considerations––being issues of fact––should be reserved to the trier of fact
unless no fact-finder could reasonably resolve them in more than one way.
They should not be assessed in duty decisions, limited or not.
This Note will proceed in five parts to analyze how Connecticut14
should respond to the TBI cases and the uncertainty about limited duty
generally. This Introduction is followed by Part II, which discusses the
legal theory and Connecticut case law surrounding limited duties. Part III
will review the Munn and Horowitz litigation. Part IV will discuss the
Second Circuit’s decision to grant certified questions of law to the
Connecticut Supreme Court and argue that Connecticut should not
recognize a limited duty in Munn. Part V will conclude in a
recommendation concerning how courts should handle arguments for
limited duty—in TBI cases and in general—for the future.
II. TICK-BORNE ILLNESS AND LIMITED DUTY: AN OVERVIEW
Duty is the threshold inquiry in tort law that determines whether a jury
will hear a case.15 Generally, a legal duty exists when a plaintiff’s interests
are said to be entitled to protection against a defendant’s conduct16 and
reasonable people recognize and agree that one exists.17 In most cases, its
existence is a nonissue.18
While no universal test for the existence of a legal duty has been
formulated,19 an actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care
when his or her conduct creates a risk of physical harm to another.20 In
situations that involve positive acts—for instance, driving a car—an actor
typically has a duty to exercise reasonable care towards people who could
be harmed by their activity.21 This means that an actor can be liable for
injuries that the actor could foresee as harmful to the person who was
harmed by the negligent conduct.22
In situations that do not involve positive acts, a person is not ordinarily
under any legal duty to conduct himself or herself according to a particular
14
Comparisons to New York are offered where contrast between the jurisdictions is appropriate
and helpful.
15
See Esper & Keating, supra note 13, at 265–66 (explaining the pivotal role of duty in whether
or not a tort action will proceed).
16
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 357–58 (5th
ed. 1984).
17
See id. at 378.
18
Esper & Keating, supra note 13, at 266.
19
KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 53, at 357–58.
20
A CONCISE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 7(a) (2d ed. 2010).
21
KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 53, at 357.
22
See id.
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23

standard of care. In these cases, a tortfeasor can contend that there is not a
duty to do a particular thing—for example, to warn a blind person of a
pothole that he or she is about to fall into.24 Liability for such omissions
may exist, however, where there is a relationship between two parties that,
in light of social policy, mandates intervention.25 Expressed another way,
the general rule is that a party with protective control over another party
owes that party an affirmative duty to take reasonable precautions to guard
him or her against harms.26 The Restatement (Third) of Torts suggests that
courts recognize affirmative duties as follows:
(a) An actor in a special relationship with another owes the
other a duty of reasonable care with regard to risks that
arise within the scope of the relationship.
(b) Special relationships giving rise to [this] duty . . . include:
...
(5) a school with its students, . . .
(7) a custodian with those in its custody, if:
(a) the custodian is required by law to take custody
or voluntarily takes custody of the other; and
(b) the custodian has a superior ability to protect the
other. 27
Even in these circumstances, however, a duty is not absolute.28 As the
Restatement indicates, duties arising under § 40 can still be abrogated if a
court determines that a limited duty is appropriate.29 A school, for instance,
owes its students a duty of reasonable care to protect against the risks that
arise within the scope of its relationship with them,30 but there is not a legal
23

Id.
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 279, at 579 (2000); CONCISE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS,
supra note 20, § 7 cmt. b, at 124. A no duty argument is distinct from the argument that a defendant is
not negligent as a matter of law. Id. § 7 cmt. i, at 126–27.
25
KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 56, at 374. The question has also been described as whether a
party has “gone so far in what he has actually done, and . . . got[] himself into such a relation with the
plaintiff, that he has begun to affect the interests of the plaintiff adversely [if he fails to act in some
way].” Id. § 56, at 375.
26
Id. § 56, at 383.
27
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARMS § 40 (AM.
LAW INST. 2012). The implications of this duty and its prior formulation as § 314A of Restatement
(Second) of Torts are discussed infra at Part IV.B.3.
28
KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 56, at 385.
29
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 40 cmt. b.
30
CONCISE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 20, § 40(b)(5), at 140. This is an exception to the
general rule that “[a]n actor whose conduct has not created a risk of physical or emotional harm to
another has no duty of care to the other.” Id. § 37, at 130; cf. id. § 7 cmt. l, at 128 (describing the
relationship between § 7 and § 37). A duty can also be created by statute. Id. § 38, at 135.
24
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duty to anticipate or prevent dangers that cannot be reasonably foreseen.31
A. Limited Duties
Under certain circumstances, courts will recognize a duty that is more
limited than the general duty of reasonable care.32 This can happen whether
courts describe a harmful incident as nonfeasant (i.e., not involving a
positive act) or misfeasant (i.e., involving a positive act).33 Whereas in
most cases a legal duty is simply a general rule of law34 that does not turn
on analysis of particular facts,35 limited duties arise through exceptions.36 If
the general duty to use reasonable care is analogous to a blunt meat cleaver
and the determination of negligence is a finely tuned instrument, then a
limited duty determination might be said to be a scalpel with which courts
can excise duties that would otherwise exist under the general duty to use
reasonable care.37 Thus, when a court articulates a limited duty, it is
unwilling to say that a defendant-tortfeasor owes this standard duty to
exercise reasonable care to a plaintiff-victim that a defendant-tortfeasor
would conventionally owe, given his relation to the plaintiff-victim.38 This
does not mean, however, that a defendant-tortfeasor might not owe a
general duty to a plaintiff-victim in alternative circumstances.39
The Restatement (Third) of Torts recommends that courts apply the
following analytical framework to determine whether limited duties are
proper:
(a) An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care
when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical harm.
(b) In exceptional cases, when an articulated countervailing
principle or policy warrants denying or limiting liability in a
particular class of cases, a court may decide that the
defendant has no duty or that the ordinary duty of reasonable
care requires modification.40

31
KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, § 56, at 385. In other words, there is not a duty to know that
precautions which cannot be foreseen are called for.
32
CONCISE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 20, § 7 cmt. j, at 127–28.
33
EDWARD J. KIONKA, TORTS: IN A NUTSHELL 119 (5th ed. 2010).
34
DOBBS, supra note 24, at 577.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
See Aaron D. Twerski, The Cleaver, the Violin, and the Scalpel: Duty and the Restatement
(Third) of Torts, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 4 (2008) (supplying these analogies).
38
See MORRIS ON TORTS 168–69 (1953) (describing the situations in which liability does or does
not extend to a defendant).
39
DOBBS, supra note 24, at 577.
40
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARMS § 7(b) (AM.
LAW INST. 2005).
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Thus, under the Restatement, limited duty cases are exceptional cases
in which an articulated principle or policy warrants denying or limiting
liability.41 In other words, courts generally recognize these rules where the
policy implications of a case warrant freeing a defendant from liability. 42
As a matter of tort policy, scholars have stressed that these rules should be
rules of law that have the quality of generality.43 Scholars have also
suggested that judges should abstain from creating limited duties that do
not reflect general rules of law.44
One central policy issue implicated by limited duty concerns whether
judges should be able to decide issues that are normally jury questions—
including issues about costs, benefits, and foreseeability—in the jury’s
stead, and without access to all the evidence that may come out at trial.45
Scholars have said that courts should refrain from defining specific duties
to act or freedoms not to act in specific ways, because doing so requires
deciding facts or considering evidence properly reserved to the breach
analysis.46 In other words, “[limited duty rules] should not merely be
masks for decisions in particular cases . . . . [T]he . . . locution [should not
be used] as a convenient but misleading way to decide the breach of duty
issue—the negligence issue—instead of leaving that issue to the jury.”47
Expressed yet another way, judges should recognize that consideration of
certain facts should be reserved to the jury’s analysis of the specific scope
of duty or whether there is liability, and not taken up in determination of
whether a legal duty does or does not exist.48 In this view, judges should
simply ask at the duty phase whether an ordinarily prudent person would
owe a particular victim a duty.49
Another policy implication concerns whether limited duty rules are
formed in a manner that creates predictable and reasonably uniform
decisions on the one hand and leaves room for adjudication of each case on
its own merits on the other.50 The former consideration concerns whether
future juries should be able to reach radically different results in similar or
identical cases, in lieu of uniformity.51 In contrast, the latter consideration
concerns whether defendants in future, similar cases will be free to take
41

CONCISE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 20, § 7(b), at 122.
DOBBS, supra note 24, at 579.
43
Id.
44
See id. at 580 (discussing the perspective that judges should abstain from creating limited duty
rules where “facts will differ from case to case, and consequently the issue is not to be decided by a
rule of law”).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 579–80.
48
CONCISE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 20, §7 cmt. a, at 122–24.
49
DOBBS, supra note 24, at 580.
50
Id. at 582–83.
51
Id. at 583.
42
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risks that the community, through a jury, might find to be unreasonable.52
To this end, scholars have suggested that limited duty rules are only
appropriate when a court can promulgate relatively clear and categorical
bright-line rules of law applicable to a general class of cases53 so that duty
is constructed from “building blocks of policy and justice.”54
A judge who debates whether or not to create a limited duty rule might
also consider repercussions on society at large and moral implications.
Courts often justify their limited duty decisions on social norms regarding
responsibility.55 They may consider the overall impact of imposing a
precautionary obligation on a class of actors (i.e., the defendant(s) and
similarly situated future tortfeasors) if they were to decline to recognize a
limited duty.56 Notwithstanding these possible considerations, limited
duties remain policy-driven exceptions to a general duty to use reasonable
care.57 Indeed, scholars have noted that general duties are proper “in the
great majority of instances . . . [because they] preserve[] an appropriate
arena for adjudication in individual cases.”58
Many jurisdictions have developed factor-based tests to assess whether
a limited duty rule is proper. These factors often assess the following
general considerations: the extent to which the transaction was intended to
affect the plaintiff; the defendant’s ability to foresee the plaintiff’s harm;
the degree of the defendant’s certainty that the plaintiff would suffer
injury; the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct
and the injury it caused; the moral blame attached to the defendant’s
conduct; the policy of preventing future harm by deterrence; administrative
factors (e.g., judicial economy); and the relationship between the parties
and their customs.59
Possible problems associated with using these sorts of factors include
that they can be treated as “mechanical bases for structuring judicial
opinions in the direction judges feel appropriate . . . [and that] they are
mainly the same factors that determine the negligence question . . .
[allowing] the judge, not the jury, [to be] the decision maker.”60
Additionally, these factors might be used to dismiss cases on a finding of
limited duty where intermediate options are arguably fairer. A judge who
declines to dismiss a case on a finding of limited duty might later issue
52

Id. at 584.
CONCISE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 20, § 7 cmt. a, at 122–24.
54
DOBBS, supra note 24, at 582.
55
CONCISE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 20, § 7 cmt. c, at 124–25.
56
Id. § 7 cmt. i, at 125–26.
57
See DOBBS, supra note 24, at 582. In relationships that give rise to affirmative duties, this
general duty includes a duty to give reasonable precautions or warnings.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 582–83.
60
Id. at 583.
53
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relief in a defendants’ favor through dispositive motions, including
summary judgment,61 directed verdict,62 or judgment notwithstanding a
jury’s verdict,63 essentially, on grounds that no reasonable trier of fact
could resolve any issue in the non-movant’s favor. Moreover, a
defendant’s tortious act or omission is not always proximate to a plaintiff’s
injury; quite simply, a defendant who has a duty is not always liable for a
plaintiff’s loss.
B. Connecticut’s Approach to Limited Duty Questions
1. Illustrative Cases
In Jaworski v. Kiernan,64 the plaintiff, a member of an adult coed
soccer league, sued the defendant, her opponent, after he collided with her
during the course of a game, resulting in a 15% permanent disability to the
plaintiff’s left knee.65 The trial court held that the defendant owed the
plaintiff a general duty to use reasonable care and could be liable for the
injurious conduct.66 The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed. The court
explained that the defendant only owed the plaintiff a duty to refrain from
reckless or intentionally injurious game-play conduct.67
Under Connecticut’s approach to determining whether a legal duty
exists, the first test is whether the defendant, “knowing what he knew or
should have known, would anticipate that harm of the general nature of
that suffered [by the plaintiff] was likely to result.”68 If harm is foreseeable
in this sense, then Connecticut courts can “determine as a matter of policy
the extent of the legal duty to be imposed upon the defendant.”69 In this
case, the court did so by weighing the following four factors:
“[S]ummary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
62
“If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a
reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue,
the court may[] resolve the issue against the party[] and . . . grant a motion for judgment as a matter of
law against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or
defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.” FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a).
63
“[If a party’s motion for directed verdict under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) is denied
and the case is tried to verdict, then] the movant may file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of
law and may include an alternative or joint request for a new trial . . . . In ruling on the renewed motion,
the court may[] allow judgment on the verdict, . . . order a new trial[,] or[] direct the entry of judgment
as a matter of law.” Id. 50(b).
64
696 A.2d 332 (Conn. 1997).
65
Id.
66
Jaworski v. Kiernan, No. CV 940464969S, 1996 WL 489038, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 17,
1997).
67
Jaworski, 696 A.2d at 333.
68
Id.
69
Id.
61
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(1) the normal expectations of participants in the sport in
which the plaintiff and the defendant were engaged; (2) the
public policy of encouraging continued vigorous
participation in recreational sporting activities while
weighing the safety of the participants; (3) the avoidance of
increased litigation; and (4) the decisions of other
jurisdictions.70
To justify its duty decision, the court applied these factors as follows:
first, finding that normal expectations accommodated the possibility of
injury because of “enthusiasm [that leads to] inadvertent rules
violations;”71 second, determining that such a limited duty would serve the
aims of “maintain[ing] civility and relative safety in team sports without
dampening the competitive spirit;”72 third, finding that such a limitation
would check the “potential for a surfeit of lawsuits” from athletic
activity;73 and fourth, noting that a majority of jurisdictions had chosen to
recognize this limitation.74
Notably, the court also suggested that limited duty analysis is properly
used to determine if, as it found in this case, “public policy
considerations . . . support[] limiting [a] defendant’s responsibility” for
foreseeable injuries.75 In sum, the court held that limited duties were proper
in injuries arising out of game-play conduct, because “a participant's main
objective is to be a winner, and we expect that the players will pursue that
objective enthusiastically.”76
In the subsequent case of Lodge v. Arett Sales Corp,77 the plaintiffs,
firefighters injured when their fire engine careened out of control due to
brake failure, sued the defendant, which installed an alarm system at a
third-party’s property; the alarm generated a false fire alarm, to which the
plaintiffs responded via fire engine.78 Reversing the trial court’s denial of
summary judgment as to the alarm company, 79 the Connecticut Supreme
Court held that this defendant did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiffs. 80
The court emphasized that an injury should only be considered foreseeable
if its specific circumstances could be foreseen by the defendant, given the
70

Id. at 336–37.
Id. at 337.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 337–38.
74
Id. at 338.
75
Id. at 337.
76
Id.
77
717 A.2d 215 (Conn. 1998).
78
Id. at 218–19.
79
Hughes v. Arett Sales Corp., No. 097106, 1994 WL 86464, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 7,
1994).
80
Lodge, 717 A.2d at 222.
71
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parties’ relationship. Thus, the court reasoned that retrospective
foreseeability based on the plaintiffs’ claim that the alarm company could
foresee the brake failure should not be used to argue that a remote
consequence of benign conduct—here, the defendant’s providing the alarm
system—is a reason to impose a duty.82 The court further noted that a
defendant should not be required to foresee perils that it could not
reasonably foresee, because this could not be considered to further
legitimate objectives of law.83 Additionally, the court discussed the role of
public policy in determining whether a legal duty exists; it emphasized that
Connecticut’s position is that “when the social costs associated with
liability are too high to justify its imposition, no duty will be found.”84
In Monk v. Temple George LLC,85 the plaintiff, a victim of an assault
in a New Haven parking lot, sued the defendants, the lot’s owner and
operator.86 The trial court had granted summary judgment for the
defendants on the grounds that the defendants did not owe a duty to
prevent the plaintiff’s injuries.87 The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed
and remanded. It noted that “[t]he test for determining legal duty is a twoprong analysis that entails: (1) a determination of foreseeability; and (2)
public policy analysis.”88 Thus, it determined that the relationship between
the plaintiff and the defendants could merit a duty, because the injury was
foreseeable, and “imposing a duty of care on the defendants under the
circumstances of the present case is not inconsistent with public policy.”89
As to policy, the court opined that judges considering the policy
implications of a duty should assess the following four factors, which
parallel the factors articulated in Jaworski:
81

(1) the normal expectations of participants in the activity at
issue; (2) the public policy of encouraging participation in an
activity, while weighing participants’ safety; (3) the
avoidance of increased litigation; and (4) the decisions of
other jurisdictions.90

81

Id.
Id.
83
Id. at 223.
84
Id. (emphasis added).
85
869 A.2d 179 (Conn. 2005).
86
Id. at 187.
87
Monk v. Temple George Assocs., LLC, No. CV010447092, 2003 WL 21036486, at *2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Apr. 29, 2003). Under Connecticut law, the issue of whether a duty exists is a question of
law. Gomes v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 783 A.2d 462, 470 (Conn. 2001).
88
Monk, 869 A.2d at 185 (citing Jaworski v. Kiernan, 696 A.2d 332, 336 (Conn. 1997)).
89
Id. at 187.
90
Id. Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals has instructed that “[j]udicial recognition of a
duty of care must be based upon an assessment of its efficacy in promoting a social benefit as against
its costs and burdens.” Peralta v. Henriquez, 790 N.E.2d 1170, 1173 (N.Y. 2003).
82
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The court applied these factors as follows: first, finding that normal
expectations favored recognizing a duty, because the defendants’ parking
lot was located in a high crime area;91 second, holding that public policy
favors a duty, because business activity should be promoted, and the
burden of adopting the measures would not likely dampen business;92 third,
determining that such measures would not likely lead to viable negligence
claims;93 and fourth, recognizing that despite different treatments of
premises liability, other jurisdictions’ decisions supported the result.94
Accordingly, the court applied these factors to hold that “there is no
compelling reason grounded in public policy to shield the defendants from
their duty [of reasonable care].95 It ultimately remanded the case for trial
on grounds that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
defendants’ conduct was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.96
In Sic v. Nunan,97 the plaintiff, a driver injured when the defendant’s
car collided with hers after the defendant’s vehicle was struck from behind
by another vehicle as the defendant prepared to make a left turn, sued the
defendant for failing to position his wheels in such a manner that he would
not have struck the plaintiff’s car if hit from behind.98 The trial court
granted summary judgment for the defendant on grounds that he did not
owe the plaintiff a duty to position his wheels to avoid an injurious
collision.99 Unlike in Monk, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed
summary judgment on grounds that a legal duty did not exist. As to
foreseeability, the court held that judging whether some injury is
foreseeable or not requires an inquiry from the position of a reasonable
person in the defendant’s position concerning the risk of injuring the
plaintiff.100 The court also found that even if the plaintiff’s injury was
foreseeable, public policy would disfavor finding a duty.101 While the court
did not apply each of the Monk factors, it opined that public policy
disfavored recognition of a duty that would impose an “undue burden” on
drivers, requiring them to position their wheels differently in each
intersection so that a possible collision could be avoided if struck from
behind.102
91

Monk, 869 A.2d at 187.
Id.
93
Id. at 187–88.
94
Id. at 188–89.
95
Id. at 189.
96
Id. at 190.
97
54 A.3d 553 (Conn. 2012).
98
Id. at 555–56.
99
Id. at 557.
100
Id. at 559.
101
Id. at 560.
102
Id. at 560–61.
92
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In DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC, the plaintiff, who
suffered injury after tripping on a carpet defect in the defendant’s sports
arena, sued the defendant on grounds that the defendant could have
foreseen the plaintiff’s injury.104 The trial court held that there was no
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant could have
foreseen the plaintiff’s injury and granted summary judgment for the
defense.105 In affirming, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the
defendant was clearly not able to foresee the nature of the plaintiff’s injury,
because the hazardous defect was not “visually discoverable,” and,
therefore, that the defendant owed no duty to prevent that injury.106 The
court further held that the defect would have had to be visually
discoverable because the arena, as a business, did not have a duty to
protect invitees like the plaintiff from all risks.107
In Ruiz v. Victory Properties, LLC,108 the plaintiff sued the defendant,
her landlord, for injuries suffered by her child when another child
dropped––from a third floor balcony––a piece of concrete debris found on
the building premises on the tenant’s child.109 The trial court granted the
landlord’s motion for summary judgment on grounds that a duty to prevent
the tenant’s child’s injuries did not exist as a matter of law.110 The
Connecticut Appellate Court reversed; the Connecticut Supreme Court
affirmed this court’s decision.111 In affirming, the court held that the
injuries were “sufficiently foreseeable,” though they occurred in an
unusual manner, because the victim’s injuries “f[e]ll squarely along th[e]
continuum of harm” that one might expect from the landlord’s act of
leaving debris on the premises.112 Notably, the court found no reason to
limit the duty when it applied the Monk factors. It held that the first two
factors favored a duty because “the activity at issue is a tenant’s use of the
common area of an apartment building . . . as a place for children to
play,113 that the third was not of serious concern because “[i]t is by no
means clear . . . that the plaintiffs will prevail on . . . their claim,” and
otherwise did not require anything unreasonable of landlords,114 and that
the fourth factor was supported, and not negated, by the decisions of other
103

49 A.3d 951 (Conn. 2012).
Id. at 953–54.
105
DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC, No. X07CV054025110S, 2007 WL 23904516, at
*5 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 2, 2007).
106
DiPietro, 49 A.3d at 960.
107
Id. at 959–60.
108
107 A.3d 381 (Conn. 2015).
109
Id. at 386–87.
110
Id. at 386.
111
Id. at 394.
112
Id. at 393.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 394.
104
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115

jurisdictions.

2. Discussion
From these cases, it is clear that Connecticut courts assess duty
through a two-step analysis. Courts first inquire as to whether the
defendant actually foresaw or should have foreseen that harm of the
general nature suffered by the plaintiff could result.116 Subsequently, if the
duty is so foreseeable, courts question “whether [as a matter of public
policy] the defendant's responsibility for its negligent conduct should
extend to the particular consequences or particular plaintiff in the case.”117
Thus, it seems that the Monk framework was intended as a flexible
statement of the factors that might be considered by judges rendering
limited duty decisions or simply justifying their decisions on how far a
duty extends.118 In any event, as a general matter, the Monk factors come
into play once a court determines that some duty would exist given the
defendant’s ability to foresee the circumstances of the plaintiff’s injury. 119
Beyond this Supreme Court jurisprudence, other Connecticut courts have
not shown reluctance in applying the Monk factors to create limited duties
or otherwise define the scope of duty.120
Connecticut’s approach seems inconsistent with the traditional focus
on determining legal duties based on the general duty of reasonable care
arising out of the basic relationship between parties, except where a
countervailing principle or policy warrants modifying the general duty
arising out of the parties’ relationship.121 The analysis seems to involve
115

Id. at 396.
E.g., Jaworski v. Kiernan, 696 A.2d 332, 333 (Conn. 1997).
117
Gazo v. City of Stamford, 765 A.2d 505, 509 (Conn. 2001) (emphasis added).
118
For the positions of two scholars on what the Monk framework was intended to mean, see infra
Part IV.A.
119
See Jaworski, 696 A.2d at 337 (Conn. 1997). Alternatively, some cases might be disposed
without reaching policy simply because a defendant could not be expected to foresee the general nature
of the plaintiff’s injury.
120
E.g., Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) v. JDCA, LLC, No. 11–00001–WGY, 2014 WL 6633039,
at *20 (D. Conn. Nov. 21, 2014) (holding that “[t]his test [applying the Monk factors] thus points in
favor of a holding that Flatiron [a financer who paid a property owner’s insurance premiums] owed no
duty beyond its contractual obligations,” i.e., a legal duty to notify the property owner that the policy
had been cancelled or advance payment itself); Lopes v. Walgreens E. Co., No. NNHCV096004995S,
2012 WL 671412, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 2012) (stating that “[p]ublic policy considerations
militates for imposing a duty of care on the defendant in this case,” where the defendant, a
supermarket, was sued in connection with a vehicle accident on the sidewalk adjoining its property);
Mills v. Solution, LLC, No. CV075009361, 2010 WL 4722480, at *12 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2010)
(denying a defendant event organizer’s motion for summary judgment concerning the existence of duty
to a business invitee as a matter of law where “[i]n applying these four factors [the Monk factors,] the
court concludes that [sic] imposing a duty of care on the defendants under the circumstances of the
present case is not inconsistent with public policy”).
121
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARMS § 7 (AM.
LAW INST. 2005).
116
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many specific facts, with the result that the courts frequently decide issues
of fact––breach of duty, and proximate cause––under the guise of
determining whether a legal duty exists. The courts’ decisions have these
results because many specific facts are inevitably considered under
Connecticut’s duty framework.
The first prong of the analysis––concerning whether the defendant
could have foreseen the general nature of the plaintiff’s injury––conforms
for the most part with the concept that parties owe each other a general
duty of reasonable care. For instance, it follows that the defendants in
Monk would generally be considered able, given their relationship with the
plaintiff, to foresee that the plaintiff could be injured at their parking lot.
The duty in Ruiz follows on similar logic; the landlord could be expected
to foresee that a tenant’s child would be injured on the premises. Similarly,
it seems reasonable that the defendant in Sic, who had little-to-no
relationship with his victim, could not reasonably be said to owe that
plaintiff a duty arising out of an accident that he could not fairly be said to
have caused. The logic of Lodge seems to make similar sense, because the
fire department did not have any relationship with the alarm company; the
alarm company, however, might be able to anticipate that injury would
result from responding to an alarm, whether or not it was faulty.
The second prong of the analysis is significantly more troubling.
Courts seem to use the “public policy” rationale to furnish whatever result
they want, with a degree of disregard for whether specific facts play a role
in the analysis, and whether the rule created can be applied to future
situations. Moreover, at both the trial and appellate level, courts engage in
this policy analysis in varying depth, and not all factors seem to be
analyzed in each case;122 the level of detail in which the circumstances
giving rise to the injury is discussed in order to reach a result varies from
case-to-case. In Lodge and Sic for instance, the courts respectively
indicated that they considered the social costs of imposing duty, and
whether duty would be an undue burden, whereas the courts in Ruiz, Monk,
and Jaworski gave full treatment of four policy factors to the facts of the
case in order to determine whether or not a particular duty extended to the
specific defendant who sought dismissal.
Another complication is that the policy factors are used as both a factspecific sword and shield, that is, to both justify imposing a particular duty,
and to justify limiting the general duty. In some cases, such as Monk and
Ruiz, the court finds a duty to be proper based on the relationship between
the parties and then discusses why policy favors extending a duty to the
specific circumstances of the case, raising the inference that a duty might
See, e.g., Vega v. Sacred Heart Univ., 836 F. Supp. 2d 58, 63 (D. Conn. 2011) (noting that “[a]
brief consideration of [a Connecticut Supreme Court case applying the Monk factors] leads this court to
conclude that an extension of [limited duty] is not warranted in this case”).
122
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not be extended on a different set of facts, even if a defendant could still
foresee the general nature of the plaintiff’s harm. This makes it seem that
Connecticut courts are moving away from a theory of duty that is as a
default based on a general duty to use reasonable care. In other cases, like
Jaworski, Lodge, and Sic, even though the case satisfies or might seem to
satisfy the first prong of the analysis, and despite the absence of some
clearly countervailing legal principle (at least at a higher level of
generality), the court applies some or all of the factors to particular facts in
order to dismiss a case on the basis of a highly fact-specific limited duty.
Cases where public policy is used to limit a duty that could uncontestedly
be said to exist on the basis of the relationship between the parties alone—
such as a duty to refrain from accidentally injurious rather than
intentionally injurious game-play in Jaworski—are arguably most
troubling, because courts have wide discretion, involving whichever facts
they would like to involve, to arrive at the reasons for which a duty is
improper as a matter of policy.
In all of these cases, Connecticut courts justify their decisions
regarding duty on the basis of specific factual analysis. Courts dismiss
cases, often under the guise of summary judgment, on grounds that as a
matter of law a duty could not be said to exist. Thus, the case is not
submitted to the trier of fact, and, by its dismissal, the court holds a fortiori
that no reasonable trier of fact could rule for the plaintiff on certain issues
of fact. Arguably, since the Monk factors can be used to analyze specific
facts, Connecticut courts give judges too much discretion to resolve duty
issues—issues of law––as mixed issues of fact and law. When this occurs,
issues of fact that could inform breach of duty––a question of fact––or
otherwise constitute grounds on which a court might deny certain
dispositive motions (e.g., summary judgment) quite simply never make it
to the fact-finder. Expressed another way, the problem is that there is a
possibility that Connecticut courts granting dispositive motions on grounds
that as a matter of law a defendant does not owe a plaintiff a duty actually
make those decisions on the basis of facts, yet not facts that present a
completely one-sided case.
Additionally, Connecticut’s approach to limited duty has led to some
uncertainty as to whether the consideration of foreseeability in the duty of
care analysis impinges upon the consideration of foreseeability as a matter
of proximate cause. In Connecticut, “[f]oreseeability is also considered in
the context of causation. Proximate cause is ‘[a]n actual cause that is a
substantial factor in the resulting harm . . . [t]he fundamental inquiry of
proximate cause is whether the harm that occurred was within the scope of

1316

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1299

foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s negligent conduct.’”123 The
issue of proximate cause generally belongs to the trier of fact because
causation is generally an issue of fact.124 Courts will only intervene in this
decision if they determine that as a matter of law some identified cause
was not foreseeable to the defendant.125
Connecticut’s approach to limited duty questions seems to have caused
some confusion between the form of foreseeability applied in the duty
analysis and the role that foreseeability plays in the trier of fact’s
proximate cause inquiry. When a court concludes that some harm is
“foreseeable” to a particular defendant and recognizes a duty, this does not
necessarily mean that the defendant’s acts or omissions are the proximate
cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Decisions like Lodge and Sic suggest that
judges might, under Connecticut’s duty analysis, co-opt decisions in the
name of duty that are more fairly classified as decisions about proximate
cause. In Lodge, for instance, the court’s conclusion with respect to duty
that the alarm company could not be expected to foresee the plaintiffs’
injury seems more like a decision that the defendant’s conduct could not be
considered the legal cause of the plaintiff’s injury than a judgment about
the defendant’s ability to anticipate the general nature of the plaintiff’s
harm, given the relationship between the parties. In ruling that neither the
foreseeability nor the public policy factor favored a duty, the court seems
to have judged some other cause—brake failure, perhaps—to be the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. At the very least, the court has
ruled as a matter of law that the alarm company’s conduct could not be
within the scope of causes that could be decided to be the proximate cause.
If the court assessed foreseeability as a matter of legal duty alone, then it
might be expected to conclude that the general nature of the plaintiff’s
harm—a crash after getting an erroneous alert from the defendant’s
technology—would be foreseeable to the defendant, who after all provided
the alarm system that caused the plaintiffs to travel in the dangerous fire
engine. Even if the court would later conclude that this defendant’s
conduct could not be the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury as a
matter of law, the decision should not be made as a matter of duty.
Stated more broadly, the problem with this sort of confusion is that it
can have the effect of saying that, where a court finds a limited duty and
therefore concludes that some duty does not exist as a matter of law, “the
123

Mirjavadi v. Vakilzadeh, 74 A.3d 1278, 1288 (Conn. 2012) (quoting Sapko v. State, 44 A.3d
827, 836 (Conn. 2012)).
124
Stewart v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 662 A.2d 753, 761 (Conn. 1995).
125
E.g., Doe v. Mannheimer, 563 A.2d 699, 702 (Conn. 1989) (holding that, because a private
landowner could not reasonably foresee that overgrown vegetation would cause a violent criminal
assault by a third party on his property, overgrown vegetation was not as a matter of law the proximate
cause of the victim’s injury).
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scope of duty owed [as determined in the duty inquiry, means that] the
defendant’s conduct was not [as a matter of law] the proximate cause [of
the injury to the plaintiff],”126 even if a reasonable fact-finder could, but
for the court’s limited duty decision, conclude that the conduct was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.
III. THE CONNECTICUT TICK-BITE LITIGATION: MUNN AND HOROWITZ
A. Munn v. Hotchkiss School
In the fall of 2006, Cara Munn entered Hotchkiss School, a private
secondary school in Lakeville, Connecticut, as a freshman. 127 During her
first year at Hotchkiss, Cara learned about the school’s summer Chinese
Language and Culture Program, which provided students with an
opportunity to travel and study in China for one month.128 Cara enrolled
with her parents’ approval.129 After enrollment, her parents were provided
with a travel itinerary, encouraged to schedule an appointment for Cara
with a travel medicine doctor, given a travel handbook, and provided a
checklist that advised students to bring bug spray.130 Although the travel
handbook was generally thorough, it contained no information about the
risk of TBI.131 The travel itinerary indicated that students would visit
Mount Panshan—a historical site outside the city of Tianjin—but it did not
indicate that Mount Panshan was in a rural, forested area that might
contain ticks.132
During the trip to Mount Panshan, Hotchkiss’s summer director did not
instruct students to dress in a manner appropriate for a serious hike.133
After reaching the top of the mountain, the director permitted Cara and
some other students to break from the travel party to trek down the
mountain on a woodland path.134 After becoming lost, the students had to
traverse the woods to reach the location where they would rejoin the main
travel party.135 Cara, who was fifteen years old at the time, later recalled
developing several bug bites after trekking down the mountain.136
126
McDermott v. State, 73 A.3d 886, 888 n.2 (Conn. App. Ct. 2013) (emphasis added), rev’d in
part, aff’d in part, 113 A.3d 419 (Conn. 2015).
127
Munn Trial, 24 F. Supp. 3d 155, 164, 171 (D. Conn. 2014).
128
Id. at 164.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 165.
131
Id. For instance, the handbook cautioned students to bring American condoms abroad to avoid
risks associated with inferior prophylactic devices. Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id. The rest of the travel party took a cable car to the mountain’s base. Id.
135
Id.
136
Id. Cara also noticed a welt, and experienced some itchy discomfort on her arms. Id.
Otherwise, however, she stated that she felt fine after the trip to Mount Panshan. Id.
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Ten days after the trip to Mount Panshan, Cara began to experience
flu-like symptoms.137 She was transported to a Chinese hospital where her
condition deteriorated into paralysis and a coma.138 Her parents, after being
alerted about Cara’s condition, traveled to China to arrange for emergency
travel to New York, where Cara was admitted to New York Presbyterian
Hospital.139 There, she was diagnosed with a form of TBI known as tickborne encephalitis (TBE).140
Cara Munn suffered serious injuries from TBE. She has lost her ability
to speak.141 She has also lost some fine motor skill dexterity, including in
her hands and facial muscles.142 Additionally, she has suffered diminished
executive function, which has affected her ability to apply her intellect to
everyday problems.143
1. The Trial Court
In July 2009, Cara’s parents filed suit as Cara’s next friends in the
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, alleging
several counts of negligence against Hotchkiss for failing to protect Cara
from TBE while she was in the school’s custody.144 After a seven-day trial,
the jury found that the Munns proved that Hotchkiss was negligent in
failing to warn Cara of the risk of TBI.145 As to damages, the jury found
Cara 0% negligent for her own injuries and awarded her $10.25 million in
past and future economic damages and $31.50 million in non-economic
damages.146
Hotchkiss filed post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, or, in the alternative, a new trial.147 While Hotchkiss did not
contest that it would owe a legal duty to warn Cara of TBI generally and
advise her of precautions against contracting it on its Connecticut

137

Id. at 166.
Id.
139
Id. Cara’s father, New York City advertising executive Orson D. Munn III, later stated that it
cost over $60,000 to airlift Cara to the United States. Laura Landro, Safety 101 for Summer Jaunts,
WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2009, 1:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204261704574
272140181146368
[http://web.archive.org/web/20160809032824/http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052970204261704574272140181146368].
140
See Munn Trial, 24 F. Supp. 3d 155, 163 (D. Conn. 2014) (identifying the disease which Cara
contracted in China). The trial court explained that TBE originates from an attack on the central
nervous system that elicits brain and spinal cord swelling that can—and, in Cara’s case, did—cause
permanent brain damage. Id.
141
Id. at 166.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 166–67. Judge Stefan R. Underhill was assigned. Id. at 155.
145
See id. at 163.
146
Id. at 155.
147
Id. at 164.
138
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148

campus, it resisted this duty in the context of a trip abroad by arguing for
a fact-specific conception of its legal duties to Cara. Specifically, the
school tried to avoid liability on the grounds that it did not owe a duty to
prevent Cara’s TBE because her injury in China was unforeseeable.149
Judge Underhill denied Hotchkiss’s post-trial motions in their
entirety.150 The Judge held that Hotchkiss “undoubtedly owed . . . a minor
child in its care[] a duty to protect her from known threats to her health and
safety [in China].”151 Specifically, he found that Hotchkiss’s argument
about foreseeability conflated two distinct concepts: “foreseeable ‘harm’ as
a trigger of legal liability, and ‘harm’ as a measure of damages,” of which
only the former, which is more abstract than the form applied in the jury’s
breach analysis, is within the ambit of legal duty.152 This reasoning implies
that foreseeable harm as a measure of damages—an intensely fact-specific
inquiry—is properly reserved to the jury for determination when it assesses
whether the defendant breached its standard of care.
Accordingly, Judge Underhill seemed to be a proponent of a
generalized duty rule concerning Hotchkiss’s legal duties to Cara.153 “At a
minimum,” he noted, “Hotchkiss had a legal duty ‘to use care . . . [in]
circumstances under which a reasonable person [in the defendant’s
position], knowing what he knew or should have known, would anticipate
that harm of the general nature of that suffered was likely to result from
his act or failure to act.’”154
With these principles in mind, the judge found Hotchkiss’s challenges
to be “more properly understood” as a challenge to jury findings on the
scope of duty, a question of fact properly reserved to the jury155 where the
verdict was supported by reasonable jury consideration of evidence,
credibility, and community standards.156 Accordingly, Judge Underhill
concluded that a limited duty was not proper in this case and that the jury
had not reached an unreasonable or inappropriate conclusion in finding that
Hotchkiss had breached its standard of care.157 After denying Hotchkiss’s
motions, Judge Underhill entered judgment favoring Cara for $41.465
million.158 Hotchkiss appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
See id. at 171 (discussing Hotchkiss’s concession regarding its duty of care at its own campus).
Id.
150
Id. at 214.
151
Id. (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-220 (2015)).
152
Id. at 174.
153
Id. at 170 (discussing the general law surrounding duty of care).
154
Id. (citing Ryan Transp., Inc. v. M&G Assocs., 832 A.2d 1180, 1184 (Conn. 2003)) (emphasis
added).
155
Id.
156
Id. at 172.
157
See id.
158
Id. at 214. Judgment on the verdict of $41,750,000.00 was amended and entered as
$41,465,905.39 in light of a joint stipulation regarding collateral source reduction by $284,094.61—the
148
149
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159

the Second Circuit.

2. The Arguments on Appeal
At the Second Circuit, Hotchkiss argued that the District Court’s
decision implicated Connecticut public policy questions concerning how
foreseeable a defendant’s injury must be before public policy itself is
analyzed160 and whether the school should be held to a duty to foresee rare
medical problems, possibly deterring travel education in the future.161 The
Second Circuit responded to these arguments by issuing certified questions
on Connecticut law to the Connecticut Supreme Court.162 The court’s order
contained the following two questions: “[d]oes Connecticut public policy
support imposing a duty on a school to warn about or protect against the
risk of a serious insect-borne disease when it organizes a trip abroad?” and,
“[i]f so, does an award of approximately $41.5 million in favor of the
plaintiffs, $31.5 million of which are non-economic damages, warrant
remittitur?”163 As of this writing, the Connecticut Supreme Court has yet to
reply to these questions.
a. Limited or General Legal Duties: The Debate Applied
Hotchkiss appealed the trial judge’s determination that it owed Cara a
legal duty to protect her from TBE carried by Mount Panshan ticks. The
school argued that the trial court’s conception of legal duty was
impermissibly “open-ended,” and that the duty assigned did not exist
because (1) Cara’s injury was unforeseeable, and (2) Connecticut public
policy was unsettled.164
As to foreseeability, Hotchkiss objected to the trial court’s conclusion
that negligence might attach to the case without analyzing the
foreseeability of Cara’s specific injury in China as a component of the duty
of care.165 It claimed that the court failed to consider that party can only be
liable for “reasonably foreseeable consequence[s] of [tortious] conduct,”
which excludes “attenuated result[s].”166 The school further argued that it
could not have foreseen Cara’s injury because the CDC had not posted
amount of past economic damages covered through the Munns’ health insurance, less the cost of Cara’s
health insurance premiums—against the award for past economic damages. Id.
159
Hotchkiss Brief, supra note 11.
160
Id. at 27.
161
See id. at 28–32 (applying the Monk factors).
162
Munn Appeal, 795 F.3d 324, 337 (2d Cir. 2015).
163
Id. This Note is concerned primarily with the resolution of the first question, upon which the
resolution of the second question is contingent.
164
Hotchkiss Brief, supra note 11, at 20–23.
165
Id. at 25.
166
Sic v. Nunan, 54 A.3d 553, 560 (Conn. 2012). Similarly, New York applies a “reasonable care
under the circumstances” doctrine, where foreseeability is the measure of liability. Basso v. Miller, 352
N.E.2d 868, 872–73 (N.Y. 1976).
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advisories regarding the risk of TBE in China. Accordingly, it urged the
court not to conflate an “unfortunate risk[] of living on this planet [i.e.,
contracting TBE in travel to a foreign country, where the nation’s
preeminent health authority has not identified a risk]” with that risk being
foreseeable because it is generally foreseeable that a student who is not
warned about TBI might contract a form of it on a school trip to a wooded
area.168 Additionally, in Hotchkiss’s reply brief, the school relied on the
Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision in Ruiz v. Victory Properties, Inc.169
as further support for the proposition that Connecticut is adopting a version
of foreseeability where a harm like Cara’s TBE from a Mount Panshan tick
must be “literally staring the defendant . . . in the face” to count as
foreseeable.170 If this approach were applied, then Cara’s injuries might be
said to have been unforeseeable to Hotchkiss, possibly meriting reversal on
appeal.
Hotchkiss also argued that public policy merited the creation of a
limited duty.171 Specifically, Hotchkiss advocated for reversal under the
Monk matrix by arguing that the factors should be resolved as follows: (1)
as to normal expectations, schools could not be reasonably expected, in the
absence of the CDC’s industry guidance, to warn students like Cara of
diseases as rare as TBE; (2) as to the public policy surrounding the activity,
the activity of studying abroad provides students with heightened “selfconfidence,” and should therefore be encouraged; (3) as to future litigation,
Horowitz172 confirms that litigation under a “failure-to-protect rubric”
would increase were a legal duty recognized; and (4) as to the decisions of
other jurisdictions, other jurisdictions declined to impose a duty in the few
167

Hotchkiss Brief, supra note 11, at 30–32.
See id. Hotchkiss also argued that, since the trial court was unwilling to adopt this perspective
on foreseeability, the jury was ultimately confused by an unclear instruction. Within Judge Underhill’s
charge, Hotchkiss has identified the sentence “[a]s the gravity of a possible harm increases, the
apparent likelihood of its occurrence need be correspondingly less to generate a duty of precaution” as
troublesome, because it could have misled jurors into considering a form of foreseeability that it claims
is improperly abstract for the negligence analysis. See id. at 32 (quoting the trial court’s jury charge
regarding negligence). The school further claimed that this conception of foreseeability meant that the
jurors could have believed that Hotchkiss did not legally have to foresee Cara’s injuries just because
they were so serious. Id. at 35–36.
169
107 A.2d 381 (Conn. 2015). In this case, a landlord’s negligence in clearing concrete debris
from a courtyard was the foreseeable cause of a playing child’s injury. See id. The Connecticut
Supreme Court ultimately concluded that, for a duty to exist, the plaintiff’s injury had to be foreseeable
to the defendant as the “general nature of the harm” and not “the specific way in which the harm
occurred.” Id. at 391. It appears that Hotchkiss has taken this case to imply that Cara’s injury is
properly conceived of as the risk of TBE in China generally, and that this harm, unlike concrete debris,
was not foreseeable to the school because it was less conspicuous. See Reply Brief of DefendantAppellant Hotchkiss School at 7, Munn v. Hotchkiss Sch., 795 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-2410cv).
170
Hotchkiss Brief, supra note 11, at 30–32.
171
Id. at 26.
172
For a discussion of this case, see infra Part III.B.
168
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173

cases analogous to Munn.

b. Arguments of the YMCA Camp Mohawk Amici
Forty scholastic and travel entities filed briefs as amici to Hotchkiss,174
many of which are concerned with the possible implications of this case on
international travel education.175 The defendant in Horowitz is among the
amici to a jointly authored supporting brief.176 In its argument for reversal,
the YMCA Camp Mohawk amici make several arguments that highlight
the possible implications of tick-bite litigation generally.177
Interestingly enough, the YMCA Camp Mohawk amici suggest that
limited duty is merited simply because “there is not [in Connecticut, a]
duty to constantly exercise supervision over children, and . . . older
children assume greater responsibility for their own safety than younger

173
Hotchkiss Brief, supra note 11, at 28–31. As to the fourth factor, Hotchkiss offered David v.
City of New York, 40 A.D.3d 572 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007), and Mancha v. Field Museum of Natural
History, 283 N.E.2d 899 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972), for the proposition that it would be improper to impose a
legal duty in Munn. Id. at 31. Indeed, the courts in these cases ultimately did not hold educators liable
for injuries incurred by children because the defendant educators could not foresee the harms at issue.
The differences between these cases, however, illustrate the procedural distinction between dismissing
a case on the grounds of limited duty (thereby precluding it from the jury) and circumventing jury
consideration notwithstanding the existence of a general duty (e.g., through summary judgment,
directed verdict, or judgment notwithstanding a jury verdict). In David, the plaintiff was a child on a
school field trip who cut her eyelid on a hayride. David, 40 A.D.3d at 573. While the David court
mentions that the defendant school “established its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by
demonstrating that it did not breach its duty of supervision,” id., that court did not create a limited duty
per se. Rather, without limiting or abrogating the ordinary duty incumbent upon the defendant, the
David court held that summary judgment should have been granted because the defendant proved that it
did not breach its duty of reasonable supervision based on its knowledge about the hazards associated
with the ride and its past experience with it. Id. at 574. In contrast, the court in Mancha held that
schoolteachers did not have a legal duty to prevent a student from being assaulted in a public museum
where allegations did not support “knowledge of a potential danger of an assault on . . . [the museum’s]
visitors and [a] corresponding duty to anticipate and guard against it.” Mancha, 283 N.E.2d at 704. In
other words, the plaintiff’s complaint, which alleged that defendants had “a duty to supervise and
discipline [all students on] the . . . museum trip[,] . . . ignore[d] the realities of the situation . . . [and]
did not allege sufficient facts on which defendants could be held liable.” Id. at 702. Accordingly, the
David case is simply an example of a situation where a general duty is applied and a trial court later
properly dismissed a case in the absence of a genuine dispute of facts, whereas the Mancha case is an
example of a case where a trial court properly dismissed a case on grounds of limited duty, without
sustaining the case to consider whether genuine issues of fact existed or judgment as a matter of law
was otherwise merited.
174
See Docket, Munn v. Hotchkiss Sch., 795 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-2410-cv).
175
See, e.g., Hotchkiss Brief, supra note 11, at 332–33 (recognizing that “the expectations of the
parties depend on the level of generality applied to describe the events . . . in this case”).
176
Brief for Am. Camp Ass’n, Inc. et al. as Amici Curae Supporting Appellant, Munn v.
Hotchkiss Sch., 795 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-2410-cv) [hereinafter the YMCA Camp Mohawk
Amici Brief].
177
Id. at 12, 14. As the brief cautions, “the issues and facts in Horowitz are similar to those here
[in Munn]; Horowitz[, which] may be affected by this decision[,]. . . may be viewed as merely the
opening salvo in a barrage of crippling lawsuits.” Id.
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children.” Amici also argue that the determination of whether minors
should be contributorily negligent for their own injuries should turn on the
specific circumstances surrounding a minor’s injury, including his or her
age and capabilities.179 They urge that this realistically means that schools
and camps should not reasonably be expected to ensure continuous
supervision and control over a teenager in their charge.180
Amici suggest that the possibility of contributory fault should be
assessed when duty is considered. Specifically, they argue that the amount
of self-care that Hotchkiss “could reasonably expect a child of similar age,
judgment and experience” to Cara to exercise should inform the duty of
care owed to her.181 They contend that upholding the trial court’s duty
would make the school responsible to help Cara “with tying her shoes,
brushing her teeth, or applying sunscreen . . . [things that she,] a 15-yearold[] acknowledged to be bright . . . not immature or incapable of making
basic decisions,” did not need help with.182 Amici indicate that a limited
duty should be considered for all “ordinary risk[s] associated with natural
and obvious conditions . . . [like] being bitten by an insect while
outdoors.”183 Thus, amici reason that a duty does not exist in Connecticut
to protect minors of Cara and Ariana’s ages from TBI risks associated with
so-called natural and obvious conditions present in the outdoors.184 Amici
178

178

Id. at 17.
Id. at 19.
180
Id. at 19, 21 (citing New York case law as persuasive).
181
Id. At trial, the jury found Cara 0% responsible for her own injuries, and, accordingly, the trial
court entered judgment entitling her to the full amount of damages awarded by the jury. Munn Trial, 24
F. Supp. 3d 155, 193, 214 (D. Conn. 2014). The jury’s finding was not itself raised as an issue for
appeal, see Hotchkiss Brief, supra note 11, at 3 (stating the issues for appeal), even though some of
Judge Underhill’s rulings (e.g., on the exclusion of Hotchkiss’s liability waiver) could have been
contested to argue for parental contributory fault.
182
Id. at 24.
183
Id. at 25.
184
Id. at 20. Amici alternately question whether Connecticut’s “child-specific” statutory duty,
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-220, entails a duty to protect children like Cara and Ariana from “outdoor
elements.” YMCA Camp Mohawk Amici Brief, supra note 176, at 15–16. Judge Underhill held that a
such a duty “undoubtedly” applies to Hotchkiss by operation of § 10-220 and related case law. Munn
Trial, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 170. In pertinent part, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-220 states that public and private
boards of education “shall provide an appropriate learning environment for students, which includes . . .
a safe school setting.” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-220(a) (2015). Judge Underhill also cited Vernonia
School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), Loomis Institute v. Town of Windsor, 661 A.2d 1001
(Conn. 1995), and Andreozzi v. Rubano, 141 A.2d 639 (Conn. 1958) for the proposition that a vaster
duty of care beyond the § 10-220 duty may possibly apply to secondary boarding schools through case
law. Munn Trial, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 170. Amici claim that the cases cited by Judge Underhill are easily
distinguished from the context of protecting minors from the outdoor harms at issue in both Munn and
Horowitz. See YMCA Camp Mohawk Amici Brief, supra note 176, at 15–16 (noting that “[i]n
Vernonia, . . . [t]he Court’s focus was the power of schools to correct and restrain students . . .
Andreozzi stands for the limited proposition that public school faculty must maintain discipline . . .
[and] Loomis is a tax-appeal case, standing for the limited proposition that faculty living at a boarding
school are ‘available’ day and night”). Amici assert, for example, that the Vernonia case only held that
179
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urge that recognizing a duty in Munn would set a precedent forcing “all
[p]roviders . . . [to] face unprecedented, ‘heightened’ duties to all children
in their charge,” deterring participation in outdoor activities that are
beneficial as a matter of policy.185
The YMCA Camp Mohawk amici’s public policy arguments seem
more generalizable to future situations than those presented in Hotchkiss’s
brief. Like Hotchkiss, these amici argue from the Monk framework that
public policy favors imposing a limited duty in Munn. Specifically, this
group of amici asserted that public policy favored a limited duty for the
following four reasons: (1) participants’ reasonable expectations are that
children act in accordance with their age, judgment, and experience; (2)
public policy favors children spending time in outdoor recreational settings
for health reasons, and superfluous warnings have the unintended effect of
decreasing safety or attenuating the effect of the most important warnings;
(3) litigation will increase, because children will be less inclined to care for
themselves, the outdoors is an inherently dangerous place, and insurance
costs will skyrocket, restricting organizational defendants’ ability to
operate educational programs; and (4) other jurisdictions have
demonstrated concern for litigation that deters recreational activity.186
Essentially, the amici fear that even “[l]imiting Munn to its facts, the
potential impact of this case is breathtaking: it may be construed to apply
to all children, regardless of age, who sustain bug bites outdoors,
worldwide.”187 From this proposition, amici claim that cases like Munn and
Horowitz will lead to the proliferation of warnings and overzealous
guardianship, eventually rendering children unconcerned with and
schools have the power, but not a duty, to restrain and correct or discipline students. Id. at 16; see also
id. at 16–17 (arguing that the remaining cases cited merely stand for “unhelpful . . . [and] limited
proposition[s] . . . [that in effect do no more than] restate[] the general duty of care in Connecticut
negligence”). Granted, since § 10-220 seems limited to organizational defendants who are schools,
organizational defendants who, like YMCA Camp Mohawk, are not schools per se, would seem to be
outside of the scope of this statute. Cf. Bass v. Miss Porter’s Sch., 738 F. Supp. 2d 307, 325 (D. Conn.
2010) (asserting that “Connecticut’s in loco parentis statute . . . Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-220(a) . . .
applies only to public schools”). Hotchkiss’s argument might have merit. One scholar, for example, has
noted that this statute provides for an affirmative duty in the context of safety from violence, but not
from risks associated with unintentional torts. See Raija Churchill, Today’s Children, Tomorrow’s
Protectors: Purpose and Process for Peer Mediation in K-12 Education, 13 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J.
363, 364 n.5 (citing a series of state statutes designed to provide for safety in the post-Columbine era).
On the other hand, however, this statute has been interpreted as a general prescription of duty. See, e.g.,
Angela L. Ruggiero, Note, Mandatory School Uniforms: Restricting Rights or Protecting Pupils?, 21
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 691, 711 (2002) (citing cases regarding the application of § 10-220). If courts are
convinced that § 10-220 does not impose a duty to prevent unintentional torts, then arguments about the
scope of this duty, including limited duty arguments, will likely persist in Connecticut and jurisdictions
that have similar statutes, unless coincident duties are found elsewhere.
185
YMCA Camp Mohawk Amici Brief, supra note 176, at 20.
186
See id. at 25–39 (propounding a limited duty policy argument using the Monk factors).
187
Id. at 13.
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188

unprepared for their own care.
Specifically, they contend that
“recognizing a duty of care [in Munn] will create an incentive on the part
of Providers to warn for innumerable risks . . . dilut[ing] the impact of
serious warnings . . . [and] prompt[ing] counterproductive behavior [with
the result that] . . . children will be less prepared for the outdoors, and
therefore less safe.”189
c. Certification
As discussed above,190 the Second Circuit ultimately certified
questions of law to the Connecticut Supreme Court. Regarding its
reasoning for certification, the Second Circuit stated that “balancing these
factors [the Monk factors; deciding the role that public policy plays in duty
questions] is a task primarily for state decision-makers rather than federal
courts.”191 Accordingly, the Second Circuit saw Munn as a case that could
implicate questions of public policy beyond its facts, because the decision
could have the social impact of discouraging educational field trips.192
Ultimately, the court “agree[d] with the Plaintiffs that there was sufficient
evidence for a jury to find Munn’s illness foreseeable, [but held that it was]
unable to determine whether public policy supports imposing a legal duty
on Hotchkiss.”193 In other words, the Second Circuit indicated that the
Connecticut Supreme Court was better suited than it was to say whether
Connecticut’s public policy favored a legal duty to protect students from
the risks of TBI where such a duty could possibly discourage travel
education.194
188

See id. at 34–35.
Id.
190
Supra Part III.A.2.
191
Munn Appeal, 795 F.3d 324, 335 (2d Cir. 2015).
192
Id. at 334–35.
193
Id. at 334 (emphasis added). The court applied the Monk analysis, and indicated that “[t]he
four public policy factors do not point to an obvious answer in this case because both sides present
colorable arguments on either side.” Id. at 332.
194
Id. In certifying its questions, the Second Circuit declined to address some of Hotchkiss’s
arguments. See Munn Appeal, 795 F.3d at 337 (stating that “we [the Second Circuit] address only the
duty question and remittitur . . . we do not reach the other issues raised in this appeal because the
Connecticut Supreme Court’s answers . . . could be determinative”). Specifically, the court did not
address whether the trial court’s jury charge was misleading, whether the trial court erroneously
excluded a key defense expert while admitting several of plaintiff’s experts, arguments regarding
causation, and an argument concerning the validity of a liability waiver that Cara’s parents signed prior
to her trip. Id. at 329 n.1. While the court did conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the
jury’s conclusion that Cara’s injuries were foreseeable to Hotchkiss, it indicated that it resolved this
issue in favor of the appellee just because “Connecticut courts construe foreseeability broadly,
especially as it relates to children,” and because of some inconsistencies in evidence regarding the
information about TBE that was actually known to Hotchkiss around the time of Cara’s trip. Id. at 341
(emphasis added). Given this appellate posture, many of Hotchkiss’s points regarding the standard of
care could remain unanswered. While the Second Circuit has retained jurisdiction over the appeal, it
has indicated that the Connecticut Supreme Court’s answers on the public policy questions could be
189
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B. Horowitz v. YMCA Camp Mohawk, Inc.
Horowitz is similar to Munn in a number of ways. Both cases involved
TBI injuries suffered by minors. In addition, the lead plaintiff’s counsel in
both cases is Antonio J. Ponvert III.195 Further, Plaintiffs—two parents
suing as their child’s next friends196—demand $41.75 million as
damages197—the amount that a jury awarded Cara Munn.198 The Second
Circuit took notice,199 and, perhaps thinking this uncanny, the Defendant
moved (unsuccessfully) to stay trial pending the resolution of the certified
questions in Munn.200 As of this writing, the case is proceeding to trial,
having reached discovery in February 2016.201
During the summer of 2011, Ariana Sierzputowski, age fifteen,
attended YMCA Camp Mohawk for Girls, a Litchfield, Connecticut sleepdeterminative. Id. at 337. Accordingly, while the Second Circuit can “decide any remaining issues once
the Connecticut Supreme Court has ruled,” id., it is clear that the Supreme Court’s answers might be
dispositive of the appeal. This could have the consequence of keeping legal communities in the Second
Circuit guessing about the tenability of Hotchkiss’s arguments, as applied to the facts of their cases and
the analogous laws of their jurisdictions. It also creates some uncertainty about the persuasiveness of
limited duty arguments generally.
195
Of Bridgeport, Connecticut’s Koskoff, Koskoff & Bieder, P.C. Compare, e.g., Munn Trial, 24
F. Supp. 3d 155, 163 (D. Conn. 2014) (stating the names of Plaintiffs’ counsel), with Horowitz Compl.,
supra note 12, at 17 (stating a prayer for relief).
196
See Horowitz Compl., supra note 12, at 1 (stating an introduction).
197
See id. at 15 (stating a prayer for relief).
198
See Munn Trial, 24 F. Supp. 3d at 214 (denying post-trial motions and entering judgment).
199
See Munn Appeal, 795 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting that “Munn’s attorney recently
brought another lawsuit in which the plaintiff seeks the same damages award for contracting Lyme
disease”).
200
Conference Memorandum & Order at 1, Horowitz v. YMCA Camp Mohawk, Inc., No. 3:13cv-01458-SRU (D. Conn. Sept. 1, 2015), ECF No. 81. Among other things, Defendant insisted that the
Connecticut Supreme Court’s resolution of the certified question concerning legal duty “may dispose of
most, if not all, of the plaintiffs' negligence claims. It may confirm as a matter of law that the defendant
did not owe the plaintiffs a duty to warn or protect Ariana Sierzputowski from contracting a tick-borne
disease while she attended summer camp.” Motion for Stay of Trial at 5, Horowitz v. YMCA Camp
Mohawk, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-01458-SRU (D. Conn. Aug. 18, 2015), ECF No. 76. While Judge
Underhill’s memorandum order does not specify the reasons why the motion was denied in conference
(i.e., it only memorializes the denial), one possible inference is that the Judge perceived the facts of this
case to be distinguishable from the facts of Munn because the Plaintiffs’ apparent injuries here occurred
in Connecticut, on the defendant’s campus, see Horowitz Compl., supra note 12, ¶¶ 5, 14–15 (alleging
that Ariana’s injuries occurred on the camp’s premises in Connecticut), where the existence of a duty of
care to prevent TBI is settled irrespective of the Connecticut Supreme Court’s resolution of the certified
questions in Munn.
201
See Minute Entry, Horowitz v. YMCA Camp Mohawk, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-01458-SRU (D.
Conn. Feb. 19, 2016), ECF No. 144 (indicating that discovery is open, and commanding counsel to
submit their trial availability through November 2016). Six-hour long settlement proceedings were held
before U.S. Magistrate Judge William I. Garfinkel on July 1, 2015, but the case did not settle. Minute
Entry, Horowitz v. YMCA Camp Mohawk, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-01458-SRU (D. Conn. July 1, 2015),
ECF No. 68. Another settlement conference before Judge Garfinkel has been docketed for July 12,
2016. Notice of E-Filed Calendar, Horowitz v. YMCA Camp Mohawk, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-01458-SRU
(D. Conn. Mar. 9, 2016), ECF No. 148.
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away camp. Plaintiffs allege that a deer tick attached to Ariana’s upper
left arm sometime that summer, leading to TBI.203 Specifically, they claim
that the camp failed to warn Ariana to wear “tick-bite protective clothing”
before participating in activities “outside of the core and mowed areas of
the camp,” to instruct her to apply bug repellent, and to educate her—she
grew up in New York City—about the risks that ticks pose.204
Plaintiffs’ principal claim for relief concerns the camp’s alleged
deviation from its own protocol. The camp did present Ariana’s parents
with a booklet on Lyme Disease that described its internal protocol to
prevent campers from contracting TBI.205 The camp’s follow-through on
this protocol, however—namely, the staff’s diligence in monitoring
Ariana, discovering her illness, and reporting it to her parents—is what is
at issue.206
Plaintiffs allege that Ariana missed fifty-two days of tenth grade and
forty-five days of eleventh grade because of her TBI, a situation that means
that she will not graduate high school on time.207 Her earning capacity is
allegedly compromised by her symptoms, which will apparently lead to
future medical expenses and loss of enjoyment of life’s activities.208 And
none of this, plaintiffs insist, would have happened without the camp’s
violation of its “duty and responsibility . . . [standing] in loco parentis [to
Ariana] . . . to do everything in its power to keep [Ariana] safe and
protected from disease . . . [while] in [its] sole care and custody.”209
202

IV. ANALYSIS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The facts of Munn v. Hotchkiss School confirm that litigating the duty
of care appropriate in TBI situations can be contentious. After all, through
the so-called ferae naturae principle, courts have frequently held that
property owners generally do not owe a duty to protect others from injuries

202

Horowitz Compl., supra note 12, ¶ 5.
See id. ¶ 14 (claiming that the deer tick nymph attached to Ariana on or around July 18, 2011).
In the alternative, Plaintiffs plead that one or more ticks attached to Ariana’s body while she was in the
camp’s care during either July or August 2011. See id. ¶ 15.
204
Id. ¶¶ 16, 21. Plaintiffs go on to assert that “appropriate tick bite protective clothing” includes
light-colored clothes, and pants tucked into socks. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiffs also assert that proper bug spray is
“repellent containing DEET.” Id. ¶ 19.
205
Id. ¶ 10. The protocol purported that campers would be inspected for ticks daily by camp
counselors while in states of undress, and that campers would be instructed prior to activities outside of
mowed areas to apply bug spray and wear long pants and sneakers. Id.
206
Id. ¶¶ 11–13, 16, 18–19, 39–40. Plaintiffs also assert a claim against the camp’s two-nurse
medical staff, alleging that they failed to treat Ariana over a course of ten or more infirmary visits for
“obvious signs and symptoms of Lyme Disease and other tick-borne disease.” Id. ¶ 26.
207
Id. ¶ 45.
208
Id. ¶¶ 41–45 (first claim of relief); id. ¶¶ 27–31 (second claim of relief).
209
Id. ¶¶ 6–8 (first claim of relief).
203
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caused by wild, indigenous animals on their property.
Under this
principle, most private landowners would not, as a matter of law, likely be
liable to persons injured by TBI on their property, precluding submission
of a TBI suit to the jury.211 In other contexts, however, this traditional rule
does not apply; an institution seems to be assigned a duty under either
statute or case law to prevent those in its custody from contracting TBI.212
The Second Circuit’s decision to certify a question to the Connecticut
Supreme Court regarding whether “Connecticut public policy support[s]
imposing a duty on a school to warn about or protect against the risk of a
serious insect-borne disease when it organizes a trip abroad”213 suggests
that limited duties are possible in TBI cases where a duty would
conventionally be recognized. In other words, the Second Circuit has asked
Connecticut whether concerns about public policy and foreseeability merit
modifying default rules of duty law.214
Limited duty rules have no place in TBI cases with facts like those in
Munn and Horowitz. The law concerning the existence of duty in these
situations is settled. Neither case has facts that would merit finding as a
matter of law that no duty should apply to the injuries in these cases.
Rather, both situations were foreseeable enough to the defendants to satisfy
the general level of foreseeability required at this juncture. As far as policy
is concerned, courts should not defer at this phase to public policy
arguments that urge consideration of specific facts where settled matters of
law—like whether a school should protect a student from a peril of a
general nature that it could have foreseen—are concerned, unless this
analysis reveals some extraordinary reason for denying duty. Anything else
deprives the jury of control over issues of fact (e.g., determining breach
210
See, e.g., St. Joseph’s Hosp. v. Cowart, 891 So. 2d 1039, 1041 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004);
Nicholson v. Smith, 986 S.W.2d 54, 60–63 (Tex. App. 1999). Courts have recognized a narrow
exception to the ferae naturae doctrine where wild animals commit injuries in places where they are
not normally found and a landowner knows or should know that such creatures pose an unreasonable
risk of harm and are found there. See Simmons v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., No. 5:14-cv-438-Oc-39PRL,
2015 WL 3454274, at *4–7 (M.D. Fla. May 29, 2015) (finding that an inmate bitten by a tick while
imprisoned had pled sufficient facts to survive a state Corrections Department’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion
on the existence of a duty of care to eliminate ticks from the prison’s premises or warn of their
existence).
211
In other words, a court is unlikely to recognize a legal duty in such cases, and defendants are
likely to prevail on a motion to dismiss.
212
E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-220 (2015) (assigning schools a duty of care to protect students
from known threats to their health and safety).
213
Munn Appeal, 795 F.3d 324, 337 (2d Cir. 2015).
214
See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, A School’s Duty of Care to its Students:
Munn v. Hotchkiss School, NEW PRIVATE L. (Aug. 26, 2015), https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/nplblog/
2015/08/26/a-schools-duty-of-care-to-its-students-munn-v-hotchkiss-school-goldberg-zipursky/ [https:/
/perma.cc/N9LR-TQVA] (identifying limited duty as a slippery slope that could permit courts to deny
or impose duty on any policy grounds that they would like to select—at worst, making the element of
legal duty a live arena for judicial and legal sophistry in each case).

2016]

TICK-BITE LITIGATION

1329

and deciding on proximate cause), engenders the creation of limited duty
rules that are not general enough to apply in future situations, and also
improperly circumvents proper procedure for ruling on facts under limited
circumstances where reasonable minds cannot differ (e.g., through
summary judgment).
A. Assessing the Arguments Raised in the Munn Appeal
The Second Circuit’s decision to certify a question of public policy at
this juncture suggests that limited duty for TBI cases could be persuasive
across the entire circuit, because the court might either construe a
constituent state’s public policy to merit dismissal of a case on the basis of
limited duty or opt to certify questions where similar questions of state law
exist. This is problematic in two ways.
First, Hotchkiss’s public policy argument (i.e., that recognizing a legal
duty would encourage litigation against schools traveling abroad) might
not be the sort of public policy analysis that Monk calls for. Scholars John
C.P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky believe that Connecticut never
intended the Monk factors to be applied to subsequent cases to argue in
favor of a limited duty.215 Rather, they believe that the decision—in which
a limited duty argument was ultimately rejected—was only meant to
confirm state policy and disapprove old precedents holding that businesses
operating in high-crime areas did not owe patrons legal duties to protect
them from crime.216 This reading of Monk suggests that the case’s policy
factors should not be used by attorneys to argue that negligence claims
should be dismissed under limited duties.217 While Connecticut courts have
certainly not shown reluctance in applying the Monk factors to create
limited duties and otherwise define the scope of duty,218 Goldberg and
215

Id.
Id.
217
Id. By reference to one common idiom, it could be said that the Monk factors were intended as
a shield to prevent limited duty dismissal and not as a sword for appellants like Hotchkiss to argue for
it.
218
E.g., Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) v. JDCA, LLC, No. 11–00001–WGY, 2014 WL 6633039,
at *20 (D. Conn. Nov. 21, 2014) (holding that “[t]his test [applying the Monk factors] thus points in
favor of a holding that Flatiron [a financer who paid a property owner’s insurance premiums] owed no
duty beyond its contractual obligations,” i.e., a legal duty to notify the property owner that the policy
had been cancelled or advance payment itself); Lopes v. Walgreens E. Co., No. NNHCV096004995S,
2012 WL 671412, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 2012) (stating that “[p]ublic policy considerations
militates for imposing a duty of care on the defendant in this case,” where the defendant, a
supermarket, was sued in connection with a vehicle accident on the sidewalk adjoining its property);
Mills v. Solution, LLC, No. CV075009361, 2010 WL 4722480, at *12 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2010)
(denying a defendant event organizer’s motion for summary judgment concerning the existence of duty
to a business invitee as a matter of law where “[i]n applying these four factors [the Monk factors,] the
court concludes that [sic] imposing a duty of care on the defendants under the circumstances of the
present case is not inconsistent with public policy”).
216
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Zipursky’s point stands for the proposition that a fair reading of the
relevant legal precedents concerning when limited duties are proper should
dominate the policy analysis. This approach might make it easier to
identify the legal principles that could merit a limited duty. Courts that
follow this approach likely create limited duty rules that can be generalized
for application in future situations.219
Second, evaluating public policy in the manner requested by Hotchkiss
implicates questions of mixed fact and law at a stage that is supposed to be
concerned solely with questions of law.220 Hotchkiss’s reasoning implies
that the jury’s foreseeability analysis—what Zipursky has called
“foreseeability in breach”221—can be wrongly foreclosed through a limited
duty decision rendered on public policy grounds. For Goldberg and
Zipursky, “the unforeseeability of tick-borne encephalitis [in Munn] (if it
was unforeseeable) may have raised a breach question, but it did not raise a
duty question.”222 Rather, Goldberg and Zipursky see Hotchkiss’s appellate
arguments about duty as “straddling two questions,” one which actually
concerns the existence of legal duty, with the other, concerning
foreseeability and Connecticut’s public policy, being “a mixed question of
law and fact . . . for the jury to decide.”223 Accordingly, these scholars have
characterized Hotchkiss’s position on its duty to Cara Munn as
“insidious . . . [and] illustrat[ive of] the dangers of a common but
problematic way of thinking about the duty element of a negligence
tort.”224 They opined that “[t]he District Court [was] exactly right to [rule]
that of course a school owes a minor student a duty of care to protect her
against physical injuries that might arise in the course of . . . a trip.”225
Indeed, this muddling raises the serious risk of taking questions of
fact—for instance, whether Cara’s TBE was foreseeable to Hotchkiss in
light of the specific facts of her injury, or whether Hotchkiss’s failures to
warn Cara about TBE risks were the proximate cause of her injury—from
the jury on policy grounds. If a limited duty rule were created in Munn, it
219

For one example of this sort of precedential treatment of limited duty determinations, see Vega
v. Sacred Heart Univ., 836 F. Supp. 2d 58, 63 (D. Conn. 2011) (noting that “[a] brief consideration of
[a Connecticut Supreme Court case applying the Monk factors] leads this court to conclude that an
extension of [limited duty] is not warranted in this case”).
220
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 214.
221
See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 44 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1249–54 (2009) (opining that foreseeability is really determined at three points
in a litigation: first, as a component of the trial court’s determination of legal duty; second, in the trier
of fact’s determination of whether or not a breach of the incumbent standard of care has occurred; and
third, in the trier of fact’s determination of whether or not some harm was causally proximate to a
putative victim’s injury, and discussing this analysis under the Third Restatement of Torts).
222
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 214.
223
Id.
224
Id.
225
Id.

2016]

TICK-BITE LITIGATION

1331

would probably be based on very specific facts, and would not likely have
precedential worth in future TBI cases and other relevant disputes. A
limited duty rule absolving Hotchkiss of liability in Munn would probably
be inapplicable to Horowitz because it would likely contain too many facts
about Cara’s foreign injury to apply in other circumstances where the duty
to care for minors in custody exists,226 and the rule would probably reflect
a narrow policy principle about rare injuries occurring in foreign
countries––one that provides no guidance to cases that do not have such
particular facts. Advocates of limited duty in these cases might argue that
TBI is exceptional enough to merit a judge-made, case-specific exception
to the duty of care. The flaw with this argument is that, as the Second
Circuit confirmed in Munn, “Connecticut decisions construe foreseeability
[as it is considered in the duty of care phase] broadly;”227 all rules about
duty should focus on whether one party would have an obligation to
prevent another party from experiencing an injury of a certain general
nature, given the relationship between the parties. Accordingly, courts
should not import many specific facts from a case in order to pass
judgment upon the specific manner in which an accident happens. Rather,
where the general nature of the plaintiff’s injury is foreseeable to a
defendant and there is not a policy reason apparent at this level of
generality to create a limited duty228—for instance, that imposing liability
would lead to absurd results in future cases, or that it would clearly be
contrary to some established principle of law or policy—then the general
226
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARMS §
40 (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (recognizing that “[a]n actor in a special relationship with another owes the
other a duty of reasonable care with regard to risks that arise within the scope of the relationship”).
Additionally, property owners like YMCA Camp Mohawk have been found liable for the acts of a wild
animal or pest if they could foresee that such a pest would injure a victim. See Brief of Nat’l Ass’n of
Ind. Schs. Et al. as Amici Curae in Support of Defendant-Appellant Hotchkiss Sch. At 23–25, Munn v.
Hotchkiss Sch., 795 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. Oct. 21, 2014) (No. 14-2410-cv), http://www.acenet.edu/newsroom/Documents/Amicus-Munn-Hotchkiss.pdf [https://perma.cc/FU4T-GA76]. If TBI was more
foreseeable to YMCA Camp Mohawk in Horowitz than it was to Hotchkiss in Munn, then a rule
limiting Hotchkiss’s duty should not be used to limit YMCA Camp Mohawk’s.
227
Munn Appeal, 795 F.3d 324, 330 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Ruiz v. Victory Props., LLC, 107
A.3d 381, 391 (Conn. 2015), for the proposition that “as long as harm of the general nature as that
which occurred is foreseeable there is a basis for liability even though the manner in which the accident
happens is unusual, bizarre or unforeseeable”).
228
The extraordinariness needed to merit limited duty on the basis of the general facts from the
foreseeability analysis was noted in Sic v. Nunan, 54 A.3d 553 (Conn. 2012). In that case, the
Connecticut Supreme Court noted that the general “circumstances . . . [of the defendant’s positioning
car wheels] in a certain manner while waiting at an intersection” did not, to the extent that such a harm
was foreseeable, merit imposing liability as a matter of policy, because imposing a duty to “make a
determination of which direction the wheels of a vehicle should be positioned in the multitude of
potential intersection situations is very difficult, if not impossible, for drivers to ascertain.” Sic v.
Nunan, 54 A.3d 553, 560–61 (Conn. 2012). In other words, courts should inquire whether in light of
the sort of foreseeability assessed in the first part of the duty analysis imposing liability would lead to
absurd results, or results contrary to some clear public policy.
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229

duty should be imposed. Courts in limited duty cases should realize that
both judge and jury can assess foreseeability and policy. The jury’s
assessments should be highly fact-specific, determining whether breach
has occurred, whether the defendant’s act or omission is proximate to the
plaintiff’s injury, and whether community standards have been violated,
whereas the judge’s should be guided by more general principles that do
not bear on the actual facts of the case, but rather the relationship between
the parties. Notably, the Restatement (Third) of Torts takes positions that
support framing the limited duty analysis in this fashion. As the
Restatement asserts, limited duties are appropriate only in “exceptional
cases . . . where an articulated countervailing principle or policy warrants
denying or limiting liability.”230
By reserving limited duties for
exceptional cases where liability for some harm arising out of the
relationship between the parties is unreasonable, judges will not
improperly deprive the trier of fact of control over issues of fact.
Moreover, where there are no issues of fact over which the jury could
reasonably differ, recognizing a legal duty does not foreclose a defendant’s
chance of prevailing on a motion for summary judgment, directed verdict,
or judgment notwithstanding a verdict.231 While it is arguable that “the role
of the common-law judge centrally involves making moral duties into legal
ones,”232 this should occur prudentially—that is, to absolve liability where
it would clearly be unreasonable or exceptional to recognize it across an
array of situations, with an eye to future implications, and without focus on
the particular facts of one case.
If the duty inquiry is framed in this manner, there is not likely a
properly “articulated countervailing principle or policy” 233 meriting a factspecific rule against liability in either of the TBI cases. The circumstances
involving educational care for minors generally carry the duty to protect
against TBI, and, at this level of generality, there is not a clear reason not
to impose duty in either case. Even proponents of limited duty maintain
that these rules must be “general enough to guide future conduct in similar
229
The converse of this position is that limited duties should be imposed where some defendant’s
injury is generally foreseeable and public policy does not favor imposing liability.
230
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARMS § 7(b) (AM.
LAW INST. 2005). Similarly, “dut[ies] of reasonable care [arise] with regard to risks that arise within
the scope of relationship[s owed between] . . . a school with its students . . . [and] a custodian with
those in its custody . . . [as] required by law or [undertaken] voluntarily and [where] the custodian has a
superior ability to protect the other.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND
EMOTIONAL HARMS § 40 (AM. LAW INST. 2012) (emphasis added).
231
The New York Second Department appellate decision in David v. City of New York, 40 A.D.2d
572 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007), is an example of a situation where a general legal duty was recognized and
a defendant was entitled to summary judgment upon “demonstrating that it did not breach its [general,
not limited] duty of supervision.” Id. at 573.
232
Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty of Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 263 (1980).
233
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 7(b).
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situations” so that the rules should not turn on specific facts. In contrast,
it would seem more reasonable to create a limited duty to prevent private
homeowners from being sued for guests’ TBI, because this limitation
would conform to the already-established ferae naturae doctrine235 and
could be generalized for future tick suits. In other words, a suit alleging
that a private homeowner is liable for a plaintiff’s contracting TBI on his
or her property would be properly dismissed on policy grounds—not
foreseeability grounds—because the ferae naturae doctrine amounts to, in
the words of the Restatement, “an articulated countervailing principle or
policy.”236 Moreover, the relationship between a private homeowner and an
invited guest, unlike the relationship between a minor student in the
custody of an educator and the educator, should not be said to include an
affirmative obligation to prevent injuries by wild creatures, including ticks.
In most cases where plaintiff minors are injured in the care of custodial
defendants, it is clear that a custodial party owes a legal duty to protect
minors in their care.237 Courts should therefore defer questions of
foreseeability and proximate causation to the jury, even if this means
ceding some policy analysis to the jury. Since duty is simply the threshold
analysis in a negligence claim,238 fact issues of breach should not be
decided at this juncture. These issues include the appropriate precautions
that reasonably prudent actors undertake and the degree to which an actor’s
tortious acts or omissions are foreseeable to the actor or proximate to the
victim’s injury.239 Accordingly, judges should take extreme care not to
make rules that impinge upon “the meat and potatoes of jury decisionmaking . . . [determining] whether [a] precaution that the plaintiff said the
defendant failed to take was one that a reasonable person under the
circumstances should have taken.”240 Doing so will show respect for the
distinct roles of judge and jury in determining—through assessments of
234

Twerski, supra note 37, at 21 (quoting Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Putting “Duty”
in Its Place: A Reply to Professors Goldberg and Zipursky, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1225, 1226 (2008)).
235
For a discussion of the ferae naturae doctrine, see supra Introduction to Part IV and note 212.
236
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 7(b). The general nature of the harm could be painted in
very broad strokes. For instance, even if a court found that a defendant private property owner should
have foreseen that having a plaintiff invited guest on his tick-infested infested premises would cause
the harm of TBI, dismissing the case on policy grounds—namely, that the ferae naturae rule is a
principle that militates against liability for private homeowners—would be justifiable on just these bare
facts.
237
E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARMS § 40
(AM. LAW INST. 2012).
238
Esper & Keating, supra note 13, at 265–66.
239
See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, Misusing the “No Duty” Doctrine in Torts Decisions:
Following the Restatement (Third) of Torts Would Yield Better Decisions 25 (Oct. 31, 2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2690393
[https://perma.cc/L2CP-V68T]
(discussing the problems with an expansive limited duty concept).
240
Id. at 12–13.
234
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foreseeability and policy—whether damages are due to a plaintiff.241
Accordingly, dismissing litigation on limited duty grounds should be
avoided—unless there are extraordinary circumstances where principles or
precedent clearly indicates that the suit is not merited—because it
forecloses the jury’s assessment of community standards of care.242
B. Other Potential Limits on Tick-Bite Liability
Even where courts decline to impose a limited duty, defendants can
raise a number of arguments at trial to relieve or limit liability.243 In any
event, a court may identify several legal bases to impose a duty, or, stated
otherwise, find that a defendant owes a plaintiff several duties. Thus, even
if a court imposes a limited duty with respect to one obligation that a
defendant owes to a plaintiff, that defendant might owe other duties to a
plaintiff. Alternatively, the court might simply take the applicability of
several theories of liability into account to avoid formulating a limited
duty.244 This Section will analyze how the arguments on appeal in Munn
might apply in Horowitz, assess the limits of legal liability in tick-bite
cases where a court declines to dismiss an action on a finding of limited
duty, and identify the limitations on affirmative duties to prevent TBI.
1. Plaintiff’s Age and Contributory Negligence
Cara Munn was fifteen when she was injured.245 Ariana Sierzputowski
was also fifteen when she was allegedly harmed.246 Both were from New
York City, and both were injured in rural environments.247 Notably, both
complaints allege that the victims were relatively inexperienced in the
outdoors.248
Contributory negligence was among the special defenses asserted by
241
See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 214 (explaining that “[t]he duty question obviously
bears on whether damages will be paid, but it [itself] is not about damages”).
242
See Sugarman, supra note 239, at 8 (arguing that the California Supreme Court should not
have dismissed Verdugo v. Target, 327 P.2d 774 (Cal. 2014)).
243
In addition to the tactics discussed in this section, defendants can, of course, raise several
dispositive motions, including motions for summary judgment, directed verdict, and judgment
notwithstanding a jury verdict.
244
E.g., Lodge v. Arett Sales Corp., 717 A.2d 215, 219 (Conn. 1998) (stating that “[t]he nature of
the duty, and the specific persons to whom it is owed, are determined by the circumstances surrounding
the conduct of the individual”); Strauss v. Bell Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34, 36 (N.Y. 1985) (noting that
“it is still the responsibility of courts, in fixing the orbit of duty, to limit the legal consequences of
wrongs to a controllable degree and to protect against crushing exposure to liability” (quoting Tobin v.
Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y. 1969))).
245
Horowitz Compl., supra note 12, ¶ 15.
246
Id. ¶ 5.
247
For further discussion of Cara and Ariana’s backgrounds and injuries, see supra Part III.A.1
and Part III.B, respectively.
248
See id.
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YMCA Camp Mohawk in its answer to the Horowitz complaint. In
Connecticut, a finding of contributory fault proportionately reduces a
victorious plaintiff’s damages award if the plaintiff is found to be fifty
percent or less at fault for his or her injuries; if the plaintiff’s fault is
determined to be in excess of fifty percent of fault, the plaintiff cannot
recover.250 In contrast, in New York, a plaintiff’s recovery is never
barred—i.e., it is only set off by the amount of contributory fault that the
jury has found.251
This defense will very likely have some influence in Horowitz and in
other tick-bite cases in which a limited duty is not imposed. The defense,
however, arguably also has a role to play in the limited duty analysis.
Therefore, the arguments concerning this defense are important where
limited duty arguments are being made and where courts decline to find
limited duty.
There is interplay between the first prong of the YMCA Camp
Mohawk amici’s Monk policy argument and the contributory negligence
defense.252 This prong concerns the normal expectations of participants in
the activity at issue in the litigation.253 It can be used, for example, to argue
about the normal expectations that caregivers have concerning a minor’s
ability for self-care. Accordingly, in jurisdictions that recognize limited
duties on a theory identical or similar to the Monk analysis, organizational
defendants might first make use of their prospective contributory
negligence defenses to argue for limited duty. In Horowitz, for example,
YMCA Camp Mohawk might assert that it expected that Ariana, at age
fifteen, would care for herself enough to prevent TBI. Furthermore, it
might claim that the facts of the case weigh in favor of a limited duty
because Ariana could not reasonably assert negligence against the Camp
without implicating her own breach of the standard of care normally
associated with being her age. Since minors are generally held, however, to
a standard of self-care that is proper for a reasonable person of “like age,
intelligence and experience under the circumstances,”254 whether or not

249

Answer & Fifth Special Defense, at 13–14, Horowitz v. YMCA Camp Mohawk, Inc., No.
3:13-cv-01458-SRU (D. Conn. Aug. 7, 2014), ECF No. 33.
250
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-572o (1984).
251
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1411 (McKinney 1975).
252
YMCA Camp Mohawk Amici Brief, supra note 176, at 26–27 (asserting that “[n]ormal
expectations [of participants in an activity that has led to a tort; the first factor under the Monk analysis]
would not require Hotchkiss to keep a watchful eye on Munn at all times [because] . . . [p]roviders . . .
may reasonably rely [on the basis of a putative victim’s age, for that victim to] act in accordance with
their age, judgment and experience”).
253
Monk v. Temple George Assoc., LLC, 869 A.2d 179, 187 (Conn. 2005).
254
Mahon v. Heim, 332 A.2d 69, 71–72 (Conn. 1973); see also, e.g., Overlock v. Ruedemann,
165 A.2d 335, 337–38 (Conn. 1960); Karpeles v. Heine, 124 N.E. 101, 102 (N.Y. 1919). Some
jurisdictions have held that a minor who partakes in an activity that is usually engaged in by adults is
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TBI plaintiffs of Ariana’s age and circumstances will be found to have
breached their own standard of care is arguably a closer case than whether
YMCA Camp Mohawk, assuming the allegations to be true, breached its
obligation of care to Ariana.
In the fact-intensive analysis of assigning fault, juries might be
persuaded to consider that plaintiffs like Ariana, being young adults, are of
an age where they can realize that ticks and other natural perils are inherent
risks of being outdoors. The relatively small size of the parasites255 might
militate against finding contributory fault, but the availability of
precautions (e.g., DEET-based insect repellent) will almost certainly
influence how much fault is assigned to whom. Additionally, tick-bite
cases are arguably more likely to settle earlier in litigation and for less
money in jurisdictions that have modified comparative fault schemes (like
Connecticut) than in jurisdictions that do not (like New York), since
plaintiffs might fear for the possibility that recovery would be barred at
trial.
To the extent that they will consider these sorts of facts in the context
of a limited duty analysis, judges assessing contributory fault at this phase
might incorporate several observations concerning fault into their
assessment of public policy. In Munn, Hotchkiss’s argument in support of
a limited duty will likely be unavailing in those jurisdictions that have
adopted a doctrine of limited duty similar to that propounded in the
Restatement (Third) of Torts256 because the facts are not “extraordinary”
enough to merit a limited duty. Courts that tend to consider mixed
questions of fact and law in the duty of care phase might be tempted,
however, to assess the likelihood of contributory fault when deciding
whether to impose a limited duty. This judicial behavior should be rejected
as yet another instance of taking the authority to decide issues of fact away
from the trier of fact. Since limited duty is used to dismiss a case, this sort
of analysis could arguably have the effect of imposing contributory
negligence on a plaintiff by foreclosing the possibility for relief based on
the trial court’s perception of fault. This consequence of incorporating
facts into the duty analysis would be pernicious in all states that have
enacted comparative fault schemes, and especially so in those states that
bound by the adult standard of care for that activity, irrespective of his or her particular abilities. See
Mahon, 332 A.2d at 72–73 (reserving the decision to adopt this standard to the state legislature).
255
For a discussion regarding ticks generally, see Part I.
256
For a discussion of this doctrine, see supra Part II.A. Notably, this doctrine is subject to a
public policy analysis, under which it remains somewhat unclear which cases are “extraordinary.”
Amici’s policy posture regarding the existence of a legal duty in Munn is somewhat more generalizable
to a number of cases than Hotchkiss’s. Indeed, amici seem to cast the net so wide that a policy
argument for a limited duty in Horowitz could be argued for using amici’s analysis of how the Monk
factors apply in Munn, even though this case, having occurred in the tick-ridden Litchfield County
woods and not in rural China in the absence of industry travel advisories, seems to be distinguishable.
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offer plaintiffs pure comparative fault, where the plaintiff’s fault is never a
bar to the possibility of recovery.
2. In Loco Parentis
The complaint in Horowitz alleged that YMCA Camp Mohawk stood
in an in loco parentis relationship to Ariana.257 Additionally, in his
formulation of legal duty in Munn, Judge Underhill cited a case that said
that teachers have an in loco parentis duty to protect students.258 These
cases concern the “student-protective aspect” of this doctrine,259 which
prescribes a duty to act reasonably in protecting minors by protecting them
in the manner that a minor’s parents would have.260
Where this doctrine is implicated, defendants might argue that parents
are actually inclined to encourage their children to take some outdoor
risks.261 To this end, defendants might claim that this sort of relationship
favors limited duty through the normal expectations prong of Monk. In
other words, defendants could argue that a limited duty is proper because a
minor’s parents would not have expected a level of care to be provided that
would insulate the minor from more remote-yet-ubiquitous outdoor risks,
such as contracting TBI. This argument seems absurd on its face, because
reasonable parents could not be taken to themselves normally act in a
manner that would put a minor at risk. To the extent that courts are willing
to entertain such facts at this juncture, however, this argument could be
persuasive if courts were to recognize that there are facts to suggest that
the parties—in Horowitz, Ariana, her parents, and the defendant sleepaway
camp—did not actually expect a certain level of care to be provided, the
absence of which played a role in the victim’s injury.
3. Expansive Liability: The Restatement of Torts’ Approaches to
Special Relationships
The doctrine of in loco parentis is understood today to apply chiefly to
minors in educational environments.262 Where there are special

257

Horowitz Compl., supra note 12, ¶ 7.
Munn Trial, 24 F. Supp. 3d 155, 170 (D. Conn. 2014).
259
See, e.g., John E. Rumel, Back to the Future: The In Loco Parentis Doctrine and Its Impact on
Whether K-12 Schools and Teachers Owe a Fiduciary Duty to Students, 46 IND. L. REV. 711, 716
(2013) (defining this formulation of duty as the “less forceful-principle” of the in loco parentis doctrine
relative to the doctrine in Supreme Court jurisprudence giving schools disciplinary authority over
students).
260
See id. at 716–17.
261
See YMCA Camp Mohawk Amici Brief, supra note 176, at 27 (arguing that in loco parentis
caregivers recognize that outdoor exploration is “widely recognized” as important to children’s
wellbeing).
262
See, e.g., Edward H. Whang, Note, Necessary Roughness: Imposing a Heightened Duty of
Care on Colleges for Injuries of Student-Athletes, 2 SPORTS LAW. J. 25, 30 (1995) (discussing the
258
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relationships, however, protective, affirmative duties of protection can
extend to adults. The Restatement (Second) of Torts has recognized that a
duty of care is owed to persons who are in another’s custody and deprived
of normal opportunities for self-protection.263 Under some variations of this
doctrine, the relationship cannot give rise to liability unless the custody
itself deprives the victim of normal opportunities for self-protection.264
Similarly, § 40 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts provides that an actor in
a special relationship with another person owes that person a duty of
reasonable care with regard to the risks that arise within the scope of that
relationship.265
The doctrines of § 314A and § 40 provide clear grounds for legal
liability in TBI cases other than those involving minors in educational
environments. Moreover, these duties can provide another avenue for
liability if limited duties are recognized with respect to other legal duties
that a defendant might otherwise be subject to. The duties arising under
these sections, however, can still be subject to the limited duty analysis.266
To this end, the policy arguments raised by the YMCA Camp Mohawk
amici and Hotchkiss itself––the arguments that motivated the Second
Circuit to certify questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court—could be
persuasive to limit the duties arising under these sections. Of course, to the
extent that the arguments in Munn turned on Cara’s relative maturity, they
demise of a postsecondary in loco parentis doctrine in the wake of mid-twentieth century social and
political changes).
263
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (AM. LAW INST. 1965); cf. id. § 320 (stating that a
duty to protect against injuries by third persons is owed to a person in another’s custody just in case
that person is deprived of opportunities for “self-protection”). For a widely cited example of the
operation of § 314A, see Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472 (Minn. 1993). The Minnesota Supreme
Court opined in this case—which involved an invitee who was paralyzed after jumping from a host’s
boat into shallow waters—that the § 314A duty to protect extended to cases where a plaintiff is
vulnerable and dependent on a defendant for his or her welfare, including in circumstances where a
putative victim has paid an alleged tortfeasor in some expectation of protection. Id. at 474 & n.2. The
court ultimately declined to extend liability to the plaintiff, because he was not deprived of normal
opportunities for self-protection (e.g., he could inquire as to the depth of the water before diving in). Id.
at 474.
264
Calista Menzhuber, Note, Torts: In the Absence of Parents: Expanding Liability for
Caretaker’s Failure to Protect Minors from Third-Party Harm––Bjerke v. Johnson, 35 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 714, 746 (2009). Connecticut seems to have adopted this sort of rule. See, e.g., Grenier v.
Comm’r of Transp., 51 A.3d 367, 380 (Conn. 2012) (holding that a local fraternity chapter did not owe
a duty to provide a fraternity member safe transportation because the local fraternity’s relationship with
the member did not deprive him of opportunities for self-protection (e.g., by securing safe
transportation)).
265
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARMS § 40(a) (AM.
LAW INST. 2012). As the reporters note, “Restatement Second of Torts § 314A imposed affirmative
duties of reasonable care on actors with certain special relationships with others. This Section replaces
§ 314A.” Id. § 40 cmt. a.
266
See id. § 40 cmt. b (indicating that the affirmative duties arising under § 40 and its predecessor,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A, can be subject to limitation under RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS § 7(b)).
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will be less persuasive where young children are injured, and arguably
more persuasive where older children or adults are harmed. Accordingly,
such a defense might relate to the contributory negligence defense
previously discussed.267 In any event, it is clear that the duties under these
sections are a more expansive source of legal duty than the in loco parentis
doctrine and other legal duties premised on a plaintiff-victim’s age.
Furthermore, defendants might defend against duty arising under a
special relationship by questioning whether a plaintiff was actually
deprived of normal opportunities for self-protection. Since the protection
under § 314A is triggered when an individual is deprived of normal
opportunities for self-protection, the domestic facts of Horowitz might
resolve in favor of the organizational defendant, whereas the foreign
circumstances of Munn might resolve in favor of the plaintiffs. On the
other hand, it seems more likely that the teenage plaintiffs in both cases
were not per se deprived of opportunities to protect themselves from
TBI—whether in Connecticut or China—even though they were in the care
of their educators. In those jurisdictions that have departed from § 314A in
favor of § 40, however, the injuries at issue in these cases could generate
liability simply because they arose in the care of the school and the camp.
4. Specific Harms Doctrine: Other Circumstances Where a Duty to
Prevent TBI Might Exist
As a general rule, adults who are not in special relationships with a
defendant property owner are not owed affirmative duties to protect from,
prevent exposure to, or warn of TBI.268 But duty to prevent TBI situations
can exist beyond custodial relationships, because there are circumstances
in which the ferae naturae rule does not apply269 and omissions generate
liability because of the relationships between the parties. Since these
situations might complicate a limited duty defense, the remainder of this
Section discusses noncustodial circumstances where a duty to prevent TBI
might exist.
Under contemporary law, colleges do not stand in loco parentis to
students.270 Aside from when they are in situations like student-athlete
relationships, students are generally not in special relationships with their
colleges, and there is thus not a general duty of care to all students in all

267

Supra Part IV.B.1.
This is called the ferae naturae rule. For more discussion on this rule, see supra Introduction
to Part IV and note 210.
269
For a discussion of these exceptions, see supra note 210.
270
E.g., Grenier v. Comm’r of Transp., 51 A.3d 367, 383–84 (Conn. 2012) (noting that “[c]ourts
across the United States have determined that college students are adults capable of ensuring their own
safety”). For a discussion regarding the modern in loco parentis doctrine, see supra Part IV.B.2.
268
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aspects of college life. Courts have held that institutions do not have
special relationships with their students absent having custody over
them.272 Therefore, courts generally do not impose liability on colleges for
omissions leading to student injuries; they have even held that a legal duty
does not necessarily arise when an injury is generally foreseeable.273
Recently, for example, the California Court of Appeal declined to find that
instructors owe a duty to protect their students from foreseeable acts of
violence by other students, even when under the instructor’s direct
supervision.274 Similarly, the courts have also been unwilling to extend
liability to colleges for the activities of students off campus, including at
social events that are not related to college activities or subject to college
control.275
Despite this general principle, controversies regarding a college’s
affirmative duties to adult students—such as whether non-clinical faculty
and staff have a duty to report students who are known to be suicidal—
have arisen and have been litigated.276 This development suggests a
Id.; see also James J. Szablewicz & Annette Gibbs, Colleges’ Increasing Exposure to
Liability: The New In Loco Parentis, 16 J.L. & EDUC. 453, 457 (1987) (noting that, “[w]hile [there] has
not been a uniform development . . . several courts in several jurisdictions have held colleges
responsible for injuries to students . . . in extreme and extraordinary circumstances”).
272
See Ann MacLean Massie, Suicide on Campus: The Appropriate Legal Responsibility of
College Personnel, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 625, 670, 670 n.246 (2008) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS § 40 (AM. LAW INST. 2005) for the proposition that colleges may be in special relationships with
students in certain crisis situations (e.g., if the student is suicidal)).
273
See, e.g., Mortiboys v. St. Michael's Coll., 478 F.2d 196, 196 (2d Cir. 1973) (refusing to
impose liability on a college because a school’s duty was just “reasonable care under the
circumstances” and college employees were not constructively aware of a hazard); Baldwin v. Zoradi,
123 Cal. App. 3d 275, 286–87 (1981) (declining to hold a college to a “duty to control alcoholic intake
by students”).
274
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Super. Ct. of L.A. Cnty., 240 Cal. App. 4th 1296, 1328 (2015)
(Perluss, P.J., dissenting), petition for review granted sub nom. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. S.C.
(Rosen), 364 P.3d 174 (Cal. Jan. 20, 2016). In this case, the Court of Appeal concluded that a student
who was injured in a knife attack perpetrated by another student known to suffer from symptoms of
schizophrenia was not owed a duty by UCLA to prevent the attack because “a student’s attendance at a
university is not, standing alone, sufficient to create a special relationship giving rise to a duty to
protect.” Id. at 1312. Accordingly, in reversing the trial court to grant summary judgment for the
defendant university, this court concluded that “a public university has no general duty to protect its
students from the criminal acts of other students.” Id. at 1301.
275
E.g., Rubtchinsky v. State Univ. at Albany, 260 N.Y.S.2d 256, 259 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (holding that
college “authorities [did not] violate[] any duty to . . . claimants” where students were injured in an
activity off the college campus); see also Spring J. Walton, Note, In Loco Parentis for the 1990’s: New
Liabilities, 19 OHIO N. UNIV. L. REV. 247, 270 (1992) (articulating the doctrinal limitations for
institutional liability where postsecondary students are injured on and off campus).
276
E.g., Schieszler v. Ferrum Coll., 236 F. Supp. 2d 602, 609 (W.D. Va. 2002) (holding that “the
plaintiff [the administrator of the estate of a student who had committed suicide at college] alleged
sufficient facts to support her claim that a special relationship existed between [the student] and [the
college] giving rise to a duty to protect [the student] from the foreseeable danger that he would hurt
himself [i.e., by committing suicide]”); Gonzales v. Univ. Sys. of N.H., No. 451217, 2005 WL 530806,
at *11 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2005) (citing New Hampshire case law for the proposition that
271
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changing attitude towards the liability of colleges and institutions for
injuries to adult “victims.” Moreover, scholars have noted that colleges
now owe their students a duty of care to prevent specific harms that are
highly foreseeable to the school, such as a vulnerable student’s suicide.277
This has been called the “specific harms” doctrine.278
In Horowitz, Ariana’s TBI was almost certainly foreseeable to YMCA
Camp Mohawk, because the camp was constructively, if not actually,
aware of the risk of Lyme Disease.279 Similarly, the specific harms doctrine
suggests that colleges in tick-ridden parts of the country could owe a duty
to prevent students’ exposure to TBI, assuming that they could clearly
foresee the risk of transmission. This doctrine suggests that there are policy
reasons to impose an additional affirmative duty to act where colleges,
unlike caregivers for minors, do not normally have an obligation to act. A
college student bitten by a tick on his or her college campus could argue
that the college had a duty to warn him about the existence of the natural
peril—if not to protect him from it altogether—on policy grounds similar
to those used to argue for the extension of a duty of care to suicide
tragedies in college.280 Perhaps this is proper where the specific harm—
TBI—is so foreseeable to the college that it could be said to be highly
foreseeable. Absent special circumstances analogous to a given student’s
particular risk of contracting TBI or a special inability to protect him or
herself from it, however, jurisdictions might decline to impose such a duty
on post-secondary institutions for adult students of ordinary intelligence.281
colleges can have an affirmative duty to protect a suicidal student); see also Massie, supra note 272, at
679–80 (proposing a rule imposing an affirmative duty on college personnel to report suicidal students
to appropriate authorities).
277
Massie, supra note 272, at 642.
278
See id.
279
See Horowitz Compl., supra note 12, ¶¶ 9–11 (explaining that YMCA Camp Mohawk
distributed information acknowledging the risk of Lyme Disease at its campus to Ariana and her
parents, and alleging that YMCA Camp Mohawk breached its own standard of care by failing to
comply with the precautions stated therein).
280
This could involve an “[a]rgument from [m]orality.” Massie, supra note 272, at 665. These
sorts of arguments have been used to argue that the default rule of “no-duty-to-rescue” should not
apply. Id. at 665–68.
281
For instance, courts have recognized that colleges might owe legal duties to students who have
different relationships with the school than conventional students do, including student-athletes.
Massie, supra note 272, at 641; Whang, supra note 262, at 43. The student-athlete relationship differs
from the conventional student relationship because there is mutual dependence between the college and
the athlete, and colleges have been known to exert a high level of control over the lives of studentathletes, limiting their personal and academic autonomy—by imposing grueling training schedules, for
instance—in favor of the interests of the school’s athletics departments. Whang, supra note 262, at 44–
45. Therefore, some have suggested that colleges should be held to a legal duty to protect their studentathletes from foreseeable injuries. For example, the Third Circuit has suggested that colleges should
owe a duty to protect student-athletes from foreseeable injuries incurred in the active conduct of the
sport for which the student-athlete has been recruited. Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg Coll., 989 F.2d 1360,
1367 (3d Cir. 1993). Thus, unlike the conditions needed to trigger duty under RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

1342

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1299

Even if a duty is recognized as to TBI, post-secondary institutions
might succeed at avoiding liability on the basis of a contributory
negligence defense. Moreover, a defendant institution would have strong
chances of compelling a favorable (if not simply nuisance-value)
settlement where a plaintiff is likely at fault him or herself. At the least,
colleges should prepare for the possibility of litigation by maintaining their
grounds to abate tick populations and advising students of this natural peril
to anticipate avoiding a breach of duty in the event that a duty of care is
imposed.
V. CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A RESOLUTION FOR BREACH AND DUTY
The law upholds a duty of great generality, resting upon and owed to
all persons, not to do acts that are unreasonably negligent.282 As a basic
principle of civil jurisprudence that predates the Constitution, judges do
not answer questions of fact where a jury is impaneled, and impaneled
juries do not answer questions of law.283 Limited duty rules can muddle
this distinction by permitting judges to dismiss cases on theories that blend
facts with law,284 arguably depriving a plaintiff of the right to jury trial. At
worst, the limited duty approach can be used to obscure the fact that a jury
question is being decided by a trial court.285
This does not have to be so. A legal duty does not have to be “all or
nothing,”286 because they should account for the general relationship
between the parties,287 and the policy of imposing a duty given that general
TORTS § 314A, student-athletes do not have to be deprived of normal opportunities for selfprotection to be owed a duty. Rather, their degree of affiliation with an educational institution itself
merits imposing duty.
Another front for liability might exist where plaintiffs are notably less able to protect themselves
than reasonable, ordinary adults are (e.g., persons who are mentally challenged).
282
Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40, 52 (1915).
283
Paul F. Kirgis, The Right to a Jury Decision on Questions of Fact Under the Seventh
Amendment, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1125, 1126 (2003).
284
See, e.g., Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 214 (discussing Hotchkiss’s argument to the
Second Circuit). Expressed another way, this could mean that society “risk[s] losing negligence law as
a form of law.” See id. (bemoaning the possible ramifications of the Second Circuit’s decision to
certify).
285
See, e.g., Sugarman, supra note 239, at 12 (discussing the problems with the liberal use of the
limited duty concept). For instance, scholars have criticized California’s tendency to find limited duties
in disputes where the existence of some duty is settled. See id. at 8 (criticizing the limited duty finding
and dismissal in Verdugo v. Target, 327 P.2d 774 (Cal. 2014)); see also Goldberg & Zipursky, Missing
the Mark on Duty, Again., NEW PRIVATE L. (Nov. 5, 2015), http://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/11/
05/missing-the-mark-on-duty-again-regents-v-superior-court-goldberg-zipursky/ [https://perma.cc/L9
7T-C8D8] (characterizing the position that the University of California Los Angeles owed no duty of
care to a student attacked by another student wielding a knife in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Super.
Ct. of L.A. Cnty., 240 Cal. App. 4th 1296 (2015), as “untenable”).
286
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 240 Cal. App. 4th at 1333 (Perluss, P.J., dissenting).
287
E.g., Lodge v. Arett Sales Corp., 717 A.2d 215, 219 (Conn. 1998) (stating that “[t]he nature of
the duty, and the specific persons to whom it is owed, are determined by the circumstances surrounding
OF
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relationship. As a general matter, however, legal duty decisions should
not assess the particular facts before a court. Although there is some
scholarly disagreement about how to determine the circumstances in which
such rules are appropriate,289 the Restatement (Third) of Torts has
recommended that foreseeability should not be considered in determining
whether a limited duty should be fashioned.290 Critically, this
Restatement’s guidance that finding limited duty is appropriate where an
articulated principle or policy warrants doing so291 remains unhelpfully
vague guidance, because it is unclear which cases are extraordinary enough
to merit a limited duty. Thus, there is a critical need for each jurisdiction to
define precisely how limited duty rules are properly considered.
The interpretation of the Restatement (Third) of Torts’ limited duty
doctrine that Professor Sugarman has endorsed—that judges should
ultimately decide when limited duty rules should be created, but that they
should take care to avoid judging breach questions292—is a realistic,
moderate position. Courts that follow this interpretation have shown an
ability to be “candid and reflective about the relative roles of jury and
judge” by reserving fact questions to the jury.293 Such questions, including
whether the defendant breached its standard of care or whether some act or
omission was the proximate cause of a plaintiff’s injury, are so properly
reserved unless “as a matter of law . . . reasonable people could not
disagree” about them,294 meriting relief through summary judgment,
directed verdict, or judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Limited duty should not be used to deprive a plaintiff of an entitled
right to jury process. Nor should it be used to expose a defendant to an
the conduct of the individual”); Strauss v. Bell Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34, 36 (N.Y. 1985) (noting that
“it is still the responsibility of courts, in fixing the orbit of duty, ‘to limit the legal consequences of
wrongs to a controllable degree’ and to protect against crushing exposure to liability” (quoting Tobin v.
Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y. 1969))).
288
Twerski, supra note 37, at 4.
289
Compare, e.g., Twerski, supra note 37, at 25 (arguing that limited duty rules on the basis of
public policy are proper, even if they are of varying levels of specificity in different cases) with Esper
& Keating, supra note 13, at 327 (advocating for reform of California’s limited duty doctrine to
emphasize creation of categorical, precedent-driven rules considering the abstract positions between
parties).
290
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 cmt. j
(AM. LAW INST. 2005).
291
Id.
292
See Sugarman, supra note 239, at 25 (recommending that judges should avoid determining
breach questions, including “the appropriate precautions that reasonably prudent actors should
take[,] . . . [and] the degree to which an actor’s conduct (or failure to act) foreseeably risks harm to
another”).
293
Id. at 25–26.
294
A.W. v. Lancaster Cnty. Sch. Dist. 0001, 784 N.W.2d 907, 918 (Neb. 2010). In this context,
the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed and remanded a case in which the question of whether a
reasonable person would have foreseen a student’s sexual assault had been impermissibly evaluated as
a component of the duty of care. Id. at 917.
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unreasonable suit. In the Munn and Horowitz cases, limited duty is
almost certainly inappropriate because the level of inquiry into the nature
of the plaintiff’s injury that should occur at this juncture is an abstract one,
and because the custodial context of the incidents and the policy
surrounding care for minors are settled, at least when they are viewed at
the level of generality based on the relationship between the plaintiff and
defendant that is proper at the duty of care phase. Therefore, in these cases,
much of the battle should occur at the breach phase, during which a jury
can determine whether a plaintiff’s injuries were reasonably foreseeable to
a defendant, and whether a defendant’s acts or omissions were the
proximate cause of a plaintiff’s injuries. To the extent that defenses are
raised in Horowitz, they should turn on contributory negligence, and
perhaps on the causation of Ariana’s injuries.296
If or when the Connecticut Supreme Court answers the certified
questions in Munn, it should not prescribe a limited duty. Rather, the court
should conclude that much of Hotchkiss and its amici’s claims concerned
specific issues of fact that were properly reserved to the jury at trial. The
court should recognize that the policy arguments offered by Hotchkiss and
the amici are not exceptional enough to merit a limited duty,297 and that, in
the first place, Cara Munn’s injuries were sufficiently foreseeable in their
general nature to say that Hotchkiss, given its relationship to Cara, owed
her a duty to guard against them.
Since limiting a defendant’s duty of care can be a slippery slope that
will encourage risky judicial conduct in disregard of the role of the factfinder and appeals of cases that have been correctly tried to reasonably
obtained jury verdicts, it should generally be avoided. Where courts do
decide to adopt limited duty rules, however, those rules should be clear
enough to guide future cases as precedent. The courts should adopt rules
that protect negligence law as a form of coherent law, respect jury
decisions, and encourage settlement of claims. Courts can accomplish
these aims by assessing at the duty of care juncture just those facts needed
to say whether (1) the general nature of a plaintiff’s harm was foreseeable
to a defendant, given the relationship between the parties; and (2) whether,
if a plaintiff’s harm was generally foreseeable to the defendant, there is a
295
The implication of exposure to an unreasonable suit (i.e., if the trial court recognizes a duty of
care) is that the defendant will be more likely to spend money in an attempt to settle the case for
nuisance value. From a policy perspective, an increase in frivolous litigation is a waste of judicial
resources, an inequitable drain on defendants, and also a probable factor in increased insurance costs.
296
Specifically, (1) whether Ariana was harmed at the camp, by a tick, and (2) even if Ariana was
so harmed, whether Ariana’s damages are attributable to TBI.
297
In other words, these are situations where “it is legally permissible for someone to be negligent
and nonetheless not be liable for the harm they cause.” Sugarman, supra note 239, at 8. For a
suggestion regarding a situation where public policy might favor not recognizing a duty, see the
discussion of the ferae naturae doctrine in the Introduction to Part IV, supra.
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principle or policy at this level of abstraction that would merit limiting
liability. Those defendants who are denied relief through limited duty
should not despair; other procedural safeguards, including summary
judgment, directed verdict, and judgment notwithstanding a jury verdict,
can be properly used to absolve liability in one-sided cases.
The tick-bite suit arguably has limited viability outside of the context
of a custodial relationship involving a minor. This is perhaps the way that
it should remain. The courts have shown great ability to fashion equitable
and fair results, but decisions of law should be founded on reasoning
supported by law in order to later govern future situations as law. Casespecific facts not needed to determine whether a duty exists should not be
taken from a fact-finder unless reasonable people cannot differ about their
disposition. By adopting the consistent and rare role for limited duty
suggested by the Restatement (Third) of Torts and not accepting arguments
that mix facts and law, jurisdictions will ensure that legal duty exists where
the law indicates that it should. Tick-bite litigation might not go away, but,
with the possibility of limited duties and other means of relief, it will not
proliferate unreasonably.

